Another "Sexy Russian Spy"? Exclusive photos here!

Regular readers of this blog know that I try to keep things classy here.  However, I've seen my esteemed Russia-blogger peers make hay on the Anna Chapman story and will not get scooped again! 

It seems that another young Russian lady has been detained on suspicion of espionage, and this one also seems to have enjoyed posting revealing photos of herself on the internet.  Never mind that she was apparently born in Latvia and is a U.S. citizen, Gawker already has the Facebook photos of our "New Sexy Russian Spy," Anna Fermanova.  But Gawker must not know about Odnoklassniki, which has this photo of the latest innocent-until-proven-guilty victim of spymania - and more!

After the jump are some more photos of Ms. Fermanova that Gawker couldn't show you.  As of now, they appear to be available online only here.  Ah, I knew I would be proud of this blog someday...

It's a well-known fact that alleged spies prefer bottle service.

Camo skirt = military background?

A Bond-worthy getaway vehicle.

License to kill.

They use benches like this for dead-drops, right?

Red Sea?

Military training...

Preparing to visit handlers in the Kremlin?

Showing some secret agent attitude.

Read More...

Summary only...

Post-gaming Hillary's visit to the Caucasus

[image source]

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 7, 2010
RELOAD FOR SOUTH CAUCASUS [Translation courtesy of JRL]
Washington had better bear in mind differences in psychological makeup and mentality of the local countries
An update on U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton's tour of the Caucasus
Author: Alexander Karavayev
EVERY COUNTRY OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS COUNTS ON WASHINGTON'S ATTENTION TO ITS PROBLEMS

U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton's visit to the Caucasus was supposed to have a sedative effect on the anxious local regimes. Pointed attention from a world power is always flattering. Discounting George W. Bush's visit to Tbilisi, there have been no visits from high functionaries of American administrations to the region in a decade. Every country of the South Caucasus pins high hopes on the United States and expects from it sympathy with regard to local problems and particularly in connection with territorial issues.

On a stay in Baku, Clinton spoke of Washington's willingness and firm resolve to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When in Yerevan, she guaranteed the hosts America's support in the same process. In Tbilisi at last, Clinton assured Georgia of America's solidarity with it. Her statement there became recognition of the status quo. The United States is Georgia's ally but not even the United States can change anything in the situation at this point or help Tbilisi reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Putin's elite and Saakashvili's regime are diametrically polar in everything but the desire to set foreign policy for years to come. The only difference is that political life in Georgia is less rigid because the Georgian regime does permit existence of the opposition. It stands to reason to assume that Clinton brought a message to Saakashvili that Washington will welcome his efforts to normalize relations with Moscow. All things considered, however, making general statements is Tbilisi's only option. Moscow in its turn is convinced that it is better off without all and any contacts with Saakashvili.

The Karabakh conflict situation is certainly different. Where this problem is concerned, Russia and the United States are more or less neutral intermediaries. A broad assortment of options is available here - positive (encouragement of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace) and negative alike.

In fact, two momentous events preceded Clinton's visit to the region. Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama, and Nicolas Sarkozy made a joint statement regarding Karabakh during the G8 summit. Fighting had occurred along the line-of-contact a week before that, right when president Serj Sargsjan and Ilham Aliyev were meeting in St.Petersburg. This clash might be interpreted as a hint at probability of military escalation in case peace efforts failed.

Granted that Azerbaijan and Armenia remain obstinately deaf to most arguments, there nevertheless exist principles of conflict resolution that are quite promising. The declaration made the three presidents plainly stated the necessity of the return of occupied Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh and interim status of the enclave with adequate guarantees of security and self-government. Establishment of a corridor connecting Armenia and Karabakh and return of all refugees to their homes are other priorities. That might necessitate a humanitarian-peacekeeping mission headed by OSCE Minsk Group countries. Last but not the least, foreign intermediaries believe that the future legal status of Karabakh ought to be decided at a referendum. Official Baku took the document with barely concealed enthusiasm even though its Russian translation somehow managed to miss the term "occupied".

Ethnic peace is difficult to establish - but possible all the same. Karabakh peace project will become an expensive political investment for Moscow and Washington and, also importantly, a serious financial strain on Baku. Infrastructure of the districts in question will have to be rebuilt from scratch. Foreign specialists will have to be found and brought in to consult in refugee-return matters and peaceful co-existence of two ethnic communities. Problems are a legion, but they must be addressed without delay...

Armenia fears that the suggested return of occupied territories adjacent to Karabakh will put Azerbaijan in a position to launch an outright offensive and try to reconquer Karabakh. It seems unlikely that Baku will want to disrupt peace process just when it has begun to bear results. Aliyev is not Saakashvili.

Read More...

Summary only...

An optimistic take on the fights over New START ratification breaking out in Washington & Moscow

[image source]

[See here for criticism of Romney's "aggressively chuckleheaded," "dumb" attack on the treaty - though of course AGT had the first word on this one]
Kommersant
July 7, 2010
PROOF BY OPPOSITION (translation courtesy of JRL)
CRITICISM OF START TREATY MIGHT FACILITATE ITS RATIFICATION
Author: Vladimir Soloviov

The Duma began preparations for START ratification. The same process is under way in the United States. In fact, the American legislators are making even better progress with ratification procedures than the Duma. Critics of the Russian-American treaty are having a field day, condemning the document at the earliest opportunity. Strange as it might seem, but their activeness may actually facilitate ratification. Arguments of START enemies in both countries successfully neutralize one another so that neither signatory feels to be left behind in the disarmament race.

The first START parliamentary hearing in Moscow reactivated ferocious criticism of the document. Mitt Romney, ex-governor of Massachusetts and Republican candidate for U.S. president in 2008, is the leading force behind the opposition to the document in the United States. The day the Duma launched debates over START in Moscow, The Washington Post featured a piece by Romney titled "Obama's Worst Foreign Policy Mistake".

Romney does not mince his words, condemning the treaty Barack Obama regards as his best accomplishment so far. What particularly disturbs Romney is that the document interferes with development of the American ballistic missile defense system, a shield from "nuclear-proliferating rogue states" like Iran and North Korea. He said that America all but had to go to Russia for the permission to expand its ballistic missile defense framework. Besides, the politician announced that Moscow stood to gain much more than Washington from the new START treaty. (The document does not apply to Russian mobile ICBMs and launchers, nor does it ban their launch from bombers.)

As a matter of fact, weak points of the START treaty listed by Romney are constantly elaborated on by all other enemies of the document. They appear to be particularly enraged by acknowledgement of a connection between offensive weapons and ballistic missile defense capacity which is what the Kremlin takes pride in.

Russian enemies of the treaty with America went public yesterday. Leonid Kalashnikov, Assistant Chairman of the Duma's Committee for International Affairs (CPRF faction), condemned the treaty for the failure to impose restrictions on American sea-launched long-range guided missiles.

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov contributed to the criticism too and made a speech explaining to critics cross the ocean what about the START treaty placed Russia at such a disadvantage. Ryabkov admitted all of a sudden that "... Moscow has never intended to use this treaty to restrict development of the American ballistic missile defense framework, global framework included." "The treaty includes no such restrictions," said the senior diplomat who had recently extolled the document in question for the connection between offensive and defensive weapons.

Diplomatic sources attributed so dramatic a change to "the game being played with the United States, one aiming to neutralize enemies of the ratification." "We watch and listen to what they are saying on the subject, right? And so do they. There is an element of a game in all of that," said a source, a functionary who had accompanied President Dmitry Medvedev to the United States last month and participated in START ratification consultations there.

In other words, the Duma permits START enemies to speak up in the hope that they will be heard across the ocean.

The American Senate in the meantime is somewhat ahead of the Duma in Moscow in terms of ratification procedures. "Yes, we know that they are making better progress," said Ryabkov. "We are trying to catch up and synchronize the two processes. The sooner this phase is over, the better. It will strengthen positive trends in our relations."

Mikhail Margelov, Federation Council's Committee for International Affairs Chairman who is constantly in touch with the American colleagues, said that the document compiling positions of three senatorial committees was going to appear in the near future.

The Kremlin is fairly optimistic too. "Appearance of our president before the American Senate was a success. Both Republicans and Democrats demonstrated willingness to advance the bilateral relations," said Medvedev's Press Secretary Natalia Timakova.

Specialists nevertheless comment that the arrangement of forces within the U.S. Senate might generate problems yet. After all, the American legislature is not even nearly as faithful to the White House as the Duma is to the Kremlin.

Read More...

Summary only...

Whither the "Near Abroad"?

 [image source]

A couple of translations from today's Johnson's Russia List:

Rossiiskaya Gazeta
July 6, 2010
FAR AWAY AND CLOSE BY
CIS countries hold little interest for Russia
Author: Leonid Radzikhovsky
RUSSIA: CIS COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN OFF THE PRIORITY LIST FOR A LONG TIME NOW

When the recent Russian-Belarussian gas war broke out, pointless but no less ferocious for that, President Dmitry Medvedev was away in California prior to attending G8 and G20 meetings.

What is closer to Russia then - California or Belarus? And what is more important?  As a matter of fact, Russia removed CIS countries off its list of priorities long ago.

Trade with post-Soviet countries accounts for only 17% of the total volume of Russian trade with foreign countries. Major recipients of Russian export include (in the descending order) the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Turkey, and finally Ukraine. Major suppliers to Russia are China, Germany, Japan, and finally Ukraine.

Neither does the Commonwealth offer anything sufficiently interesting to Russian investors. Economies of most post-Soviet countries are so weak and legislations so bizarre that Russian businesses know better then invest in neighbors. Ukraine is probably the only exception. Roman Abramovich and Alisher Usmanov did procure some assets in Donbass there; Ukraine's Antonov Company recently joined the Russian United Aircraft Corporation.

As for human contacts, approximately 20 million Russians visited distant foreign countries and about 13 million chose CIS countries in 2008 (no hard data on 2009 travel yet).

Where political relations are concerned, the overall situation is no better. Everyone remembers conflicts with Georgia (and not just verbal conflicts, unfortunately), Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine (under its previous president), and the permanent "brotherly" quarrel with Belarus. Compared to that, Russia's relations with major European countries, China, India, Japan, Middle East countries, African and Latin American states are but exemplary.

So is the relationship with the United States. There are no trade, political, or even information wars between our countries any more. Attitude toward the United States in Russia is changing for the better. Forty-six percent Russians did not see the United States as an adversary a year ago. These days, they already number 59%.

Conclusions:
1. Russia has many more common economic interests with the European Union, China, and America than with its CIS neighbors;
2. conflicts with CIS countries vastly outnumber quarrels with distant foreign countries.

What about the Commonwealth being a zone of Russia's special interests or zone of influence then? The impression is that the Kremlin means to establish Russian domination of the post-Soviet zone. Forget it. No post-Soviet country will put up with it anymore. Political establishments throughout the Commonwealth are as sensitive to Russian political dictatorship as the Russian establishment is to American or Chinese. Meaning that no dictatorship at all will be tolerated.

And what do we have then? The Commonwealth has nothing to offer Russia in terms of modernization, particularly technological, that official Moscow is focused on, these days. The Ferghana Valley is not the Silicon Alley after all.

Security of Russia requires at least relative political stability in Central Asia. Unfortunately, the latest developments in Kyrgyzstan make it plain that Russian clout with this region, Russia's ability to exert influence with it, is quite restricted, not to say non-existent. God bless the Kremlin for having had the
sense not to send Russian paratroops to rioting Kyrgyzstan. And not to try to tame another regime that would have cost it dearly without giving anything worthwhile in return.

Russia lacks the resources (financial, moral, or physical) for the so called "strong" policy in the region. It follows that it had better abandon its penchant for shouldering all of the responsibility for Central Asia and start involving other
countries. After all, all of the international community ought to be interested in a stable Central Asia. Once again, the recent events in Kyrgyzstan are proof that nobody in the world is really eager to become involved.

Last but not the least, Moscow should finally do something about the endless saga of the so called Russian-Belarussian union.

The Russian-Belarussian union is not a harmless myth. This concept (for lack of a better term) is a source of endless conflicts. Were it not for this myth, it would never have occurred even to Minsk to demand all these colossal preferences and unprecedented discounts from Moscow. Time to dispel this myth and shut down this stillborn project. Invented by Boris Yeltsin's PR specialists in 1996, it has made no progress at all in all these years. What it keeps fomenting are scandals and quarrels. Were it not for the myth itself, there would have been no high hopes and expectations that are so frequently frustrated. This lie about a union harms both countries. Time to say that there is no Russian-Belarussian union and there has never been any.

Labor immigration is Russia's major link with CIS countries. The need for cheap labor will keep growing, and Central Asia remains the essentially inexhaustible source of menial workers. This is what Russia ought to focus on. It ought to perfect immigration legislation and so on - but this is Russia's domestic affair that has nothing at all to do with influence with Central Asian countries.

It all comes down to a choice, really. When the concept of "relations of priority" with CIS countries collides with reality, something ought to be done. Either concept amended, or reality changed. What's your pleasure?

___________________________________________________

Kommersant
July 6, 2010
RELOAD BYPASSING RUSSIA
Official Washington is rebuilding its clout with Ukraine and republics of the Caucasus
Author: Alexander Gabuyev, Georgy Dvali, Rafael Mustafayev, Ike Dzhanpoladjan
WASHINGTON DISAGREES WITH THE CONCEPT THAT REGARDS UKRAINE AND THE CAUCASUS AS A ZONE OF MOSCOW'S EXCLUSIVE INTERESTS

U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton completed her tour of Ukraine, Poland, and three countries of the Caucasus. The trip was intended to bolster America's clout with these countries and facilitate Nabucco, project of a gas pipeline to Europe bypassing Russia. Reload or no reload, Clinton's tour plainly shows that the United States denies Russia the right to regard Ukraine and republics of the Caucasus as a zone of its special, much less exclusive interests.

Clinton visited Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia - just like Vice President Joe Biden did a year ago. Biden visited Ukraine and Georgia right in the wake of his patron Barack Obama's triumphant visit to the capital of Russia. It was Washington's way of telling Moscow that the United States stands by its allies regardless of what might be happening in and with the American-Russian relations.

It is fair to add that America's positions in the region did weaken in the last twelve months. New President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich began his term of office with the permission to Russia to leave its Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea after 2017. Not a single senior functionary of the U.S. Administration visited Ukraine yet (before Clinton). As for Poland, it is still seething at Obama for abandonment of his predecessor's plans to develop the third position area in this country (and in the Czech Republic). Where countries of the Caucasus are concerned, it was Clinton's first visit there in the capacity of the state secretary. Moreover, the United States does not even have its ambassador in Azerbaijan. Its inability to choose an adequate candidate remains a source of quiet resentment for official Baku.

That Clinton could not hope to solve or even address all problems in the course of so brief a visit goes without saying. Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon explained that Clinton's tour was supposed to demonstrate that the United States has no intention to abandon its own interests in the region for the sake of betterment of the relations with Moscow. In fact, Clinton's brief stay in Kiev confirmed it. She discussed with Yanukovich advancement of the relations between Ukraine and the Western community and assured him that NATO was always there, waiting for him to change his mind perhaps and apply for membership after all.

The day Clinton deplaned in Kiev, the International Monetary Fund declared readiness to loan Ukraine $14.9 billion. Foreign Minister Konstantin Grischenko in the meantime announced that Clinton and he discussed "diversification of nuclear fuel suppliers". Contract with Russia's TVEL signed last month all but made the Russians monopolists in the Ukrainian market of nuclear fuel - or so the Russians thought. It seems now that Westinghouse might elbow its way in, too.

Clinton visited Azerbaijan and Armenia within a single day, Sunday. She met with presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serj Sargsjan as well as with her opposite numbers Elmar Mamedjarov and Edward Nalbandjan. The visitor spoke, choosing her words carefully, of the necessity to settle the matter of Karabakh on the basis of the
Madrid Principles formulated by the OSCE Minsk Group. Considering seriousness of the problem, it is unlikely that Clinton expected her brief speech to have any effect on Karabakh conflict resolution process.

In any event, she had other things to discuss with the hosts, things of more immediate interest to the United States. With Sargsjan, she discussed normalization of the relations with Turkey and called for the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border the sooner the better. In Azerbaijan, the discourse was centered around energy cooperation. Neither Clinton nor Azerbaijani functionaries offered comment afterwards, but observers assumed that they had been discussing Nabucco, the international project halted due to the discord between Baku and Ankara over gas transit. In fact, Aliyev put off his planned visit to Turkey on two occasions already.

Georgia was the last stop on Clinton's route. The visiting U.S. functionary called Abkhazia and South Ossetia "occupied by Russia" to President Mikhail Saakashvili's vast relief. Her meeting with Saakashvili over, Clinton met with leaders of the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. The former are represented in the parliament of Georgia. Leader of the latter Irakly Alasania had polled almost 20% in the race for mayor of Tbilisi not long ago. Official Washington regards Alasania as a promising politician in the light of the presidential election scheduled to take place in Georgia in 2013. Also importantly, Alasania served as representative of Georgia to the UN in the past. He has extensive contacts within the American establishment.

Alasania's aide Aleksy Petriashvili said that his patron and Clinton discussed politics - presidential election, undesirability of amendment of the Constitution or transformation of Georgia into a parliamentary republic where Saakashvili will remain essentially the ruler in the premier's capacity.

Read More...

Summary only...

Talking past each other

[image source]

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 5, 2010
Russian language loses its status [translation from JRL]
The Ukrainian leadership provoked a new wave of "linguistic sovereignty"
By Tatiana Ivzhenko (Kiev)

Ukraine is facing another language war: recently, Leninsky District Court of Sevastopol had overturned the decision made by the Sevastopol City Council on awarding Russian a regional language status. At the same time, the resolution, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Crimea on May 26, on implementation of constitutional guarantees on the free use of the Russian language, which implies a de facto rise of status of the Russian language in the autonomy, remains in force. All the confusion could be settled by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, although deputies note that the language politics are once again being influenced by the election campaign.

Late last week, the Ukrainian parliament had scheduled local elections for October 31. These election results will determine if the ruling Party of Regions will be able to complete the formation of a rigid vertical of power or be forced to deal with the powerful opposition, represented by regional structures. Therefore, it looks as though all pressing issues, capable of splitting the society, are being set aside until after the elections ­ one of which is the language issue.

The position to grant the Russian language a status of the second official state language was a part of the election campaign program of the Party of Regions and Viktor Yanukovich. Soon after the elections, an ally of the newly-elected president, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Anna German, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) that an immediate implementation of the campaign promise should not be expected. She explained that it requires a complex and lengthy procedure of amending the Ukrainian Constitution. "When supporters of the idea to raise the Russian language to the official state level have a constitutional majority of 300 votes in the Verkhovna Rada, then this issue may be resolved," said German.

She added that Yanukovich will not wait until the number of allies in the parliament increases, and will, instead, resolve the problem by other means: "We could implement the European Charter for Regional of Minority Languages in the Ukrainian legislation, which will allow giving Russian a regional status in places with Russian-speaking population".

In mid-May, a corresponding bill was registered in the parliament by Party of Regions deputy Vadim Kolesnichenko. He explained that in case the document is adopted, local authorities will be able to independently make decisions on regional language or languages ­ "in places where more than 10% speak the regional language". The deputy does expect the bill to be approved before the summer legislative recess, although he did caution: "There is one sword of Damocles, which is also known as 'the approaching [local] elections'". However, Kolesnichenko was talking about the elections in the context of the Party of Regions' implementation of its election pledges. Meanwhile, Yanukovich's current allies in the parliamentary coalition view the problem differently.

Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Vladimir Litvin, whose faction is part of the coalition, fears that the language issue will deepen the split of Ukraine. Many experts have criticized Litvin, suspecting him in an attempt to pass between two fires by neither supporting the idea of raising the Russian language's status nor the maintenance of the linguistic status-quo.

The situation, developing around the status of the Russian language, could divide the country.

This opinion is strongly shared by the Communist Party, which had registered its own language law much earlier than Kolesnikov had submitted his document. Its author, Deputy Leonid Grach, believes that many politicians are, once again, trying to exploit the language issue with the objective to benefit at the elections, but are not planning to change anything about the situation that has unfolded in Ukraine. He recalls that Yanukovich promised to raise the status of Russian to the level of an official state language in 2004 and in 2009, but in the end, distanced himself from the process.

Vadim Kolesnichenko agrees that "Russian is the native language for 30% of the population, all other national minority languages amount to 0.4%". That is precisely why he is convinced that adoption of his draft law, will, de facto, lead to upgrading the status of Russian on most territories.

Because resolution of the question is once again being delayed and is drowning in procedural complexities, in late May, the Supreme Soviet of Crimea had adopted a decision to raise the status of Russian on the territory of the autonomy. This prompted protests from Crimea's Tatars and national-democratic forces in Kiev. Deputies of Viktor Yushchenko's party insisted that the prosecutor general initiates legal action in connection to the violation of the Constitution of Ukraine. Even Party of Regions deputies agree that their Crimean colleagues had put the cart before the horse by refusing to wait until the issue is settled at the national level. "They will have Supreme Soviet elections in the fall; that is why they are in a hurry to score some points," a member of the ruling coalition ­ who agrees with the view that, in doing so, Crimea's deputies have compromised the ratings of the Party of Regions ­ told NG. Neither Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office nor the Ministry of Justice had reacted to the situation. Meanwhile, the Odessa Oblast of Ukraine is preparing to declare "Russian language sovereignty".

In order to save face and keep the situation under control, central authorities are forced to act the same as Viktor Yushchenko's allies did in 2006 ­ through the courts. The former president's team managed to extinguish the "language fire" with harsh judicial verdicts, which accused the local authorities of exceeding their limits of authority and violation of the Constitution. The new decision of the Sevastopol District Court continues the old tradition. However, the problem cannot be resolved without it being regulated by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It looks as though one document won't be enough. Even its author, Kolesnikov, admits that in the years since its independence, Ukraine has adopted "more than 100 laws, which directly prohibit the use of Russian language and other national minority languages". Meanwhile, the authorities, who are busy tackling economic problems and preparing for the local elections, do not have enough time to reconcile these documents, raising the status of Russian, if not to the official state level, then at least to the level of an official language for documentation.

Read More...

Summary only...

Moldova's neighborhood as seen from Moscow

Selections from the June 25 and June 28 editions of RIA Novosti's "What the Russian Papers Say" section:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Bucharest blacklists Moscow

Romanian President Traian Basescu has submitted to the parliament a draft national defense strategy listing Russia as an external threat. The document says the deployment of Russian forces in the Republic of Moldova threatens Romania's national security.

The defense strategy mentions the deployment of foreign troops, rather than Russia's peacekeeping force, near Romanian borders. Moldovan media has promptly reported Bucharest's intention to take an active part in the region's demilitarization and the withdrawal of illegally deployed weapons systems.

The response in Transnistria, a breakaway territory located between the Dniester River, the eastern Moldovan border, and Ukraine, where the Russian task force is deployed, has been more emphatic: Bucharest must not intervene, or it will do more harm than good.

Transnistria's Foreign Minister Vladimir Yastrebchak stressed that the self-proclaimed republic's stance regarding the presence of the Russian peacekeeping force and limited troop contingent on its territory had remained unchanged since the end of the 1992 armed conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

Commenting on Romania's proposal to mediate a bilateral peace settlement, Yastrebchak said Bucharest had already acted as mediator in the run-up to the 1992 war. At the time Romania supplied weapons to the Moldovan army, which had unleashed the conflict.

It may be a paradox, but Serafim Urekyan, leader of the Alliance Our Moldova, part of the Alliance for European Integration ruling coalition, supported Yastrebchak. Although Moldova and Romania are more than just neighbors, Bucharest had better mind its own business and not intervene in our affairs, Urekyan said.

The Moldovan politician said the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol should be settled in line with the Five Plus Two negotiating format involving Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as guarantors and mediators, the European Union and the United States as observers, as well as Moldova and Transnistria as the parties to the conflict.

Urekyan also said the peace settlement should duly heed the relevant agreements on this issue between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Bucharest's new draft national security strategy notes that the last barriers dividing a single nation could be eliminated by involving Romania in a common European space, Urekyan said. This implies Moldova being openly called a second Romanian state by Bucharest, which does not recognize the existence of the Moldovan nation.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow and Brussels would do everything possible to resume negotiations, and that the main task was to search for a mutually acceptable resolution of this conflict through the preservation and strengthening of Moldovan sovereignty. Lavrov added that the EU may become involved in the Transnistria peacekeeping mission.



Vzglyad [often-tendentious online pro-Kremlin rag] - Top Moldovan official signs controversial document

(Acting Moldovan president tries to add Soviet Occupation Day to national calendar)

Moldovan Parliament Speaker Mihai Gimpu, who is now acting president of Moldova, has signed a decree on marking Soviet Occupation Day every June 28. Gimpu admitted that he had issued the decree without consulting his colleagues in the Alliance for European Integration ruling coalition.

On June 28, 1940, Soviet forces entered Bessarabia, and this became a black day in the history of Moldova, Gimpu said.

Political analyst Pavel Svyatenkov at the Moscow-based Institute of National Strategy said Moldova was following in the wake of other East European states, former Warsaw Pact members.

"But Moldova was part of the Soviet Union. It has an absolutely special status because Moldovan nationalists believe that there is only one Romanian, rather than Moldovan, nation. Moldova's conversion to anti-Communism is another step in severing ties with Russia," Svyatenko told the paper.

Gennady Konenko, head of the Moldova and Transdnestr section at the Institute of CIS Studies, said the decision to institute Soviet Occupation Day was not historically or legally motivated. He said Romania had taken advantage of Soviet Russia's weaknesses in 1918 and seized the Bessarabia Gubernia (Region) which had been part of the Russian Empire since 1812.

The opposition Communist Party of Moldova thinks that Gimpu has soured relations with Russia and was whipping up an anti-Communist hysteria in order to boost his popularity ratings before presidential elections. The latest opinion polls show Gimpu is supported by only 2% of respondents. Consequently, he is in no position to assume top state positions in the future.

In his decree, Gimpu demanded that Russia, the Soviet Union's legal successor, unconditionally and promptly withdraw its forces and weapons from Moldova. A Russian troop contingent has been fulfilling a peacekeeping mission in the self-proclaimed Transdnestr Republic since 1992.

Yuri Muntyan, Executive Secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party's Central Committee, said Gimpu and other ruling coalition leaders were ready to deprive Russian of its interethnic language status, and were preparing to amend the current polyethnic national policy concept.

Muntyan said his party was preparing to oppose official repressions strictly by legal means. The Communist Party is confident that Gimpu's decisions will be abolished after it stages a political comeback. Consequently, there will probably not be enough time for June 28 to become part of Moldova's political calendar.



Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Moldova to mark Soviet Occupation Day

New tensions in Russian-Moldovan relations were provoked by Moldovan authorities, who declared June 28 Soviet Occupation Day. Russia is the legal successor of the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991, and must now withdraw its "occupation troops" from Transdnestr, a breakaway republic of Moldova, the Moldovan leader said in a decree.

Acting President Mihai Ghimpu has recreated the situation of 1991, when his predecessor, Mircea Snegur declared war on Russia during his speech in parliament, but took his words back almost immediately. However, Ghimpu will not rethink or reword his demand.

He is preparing for the parliamentary and possibly presidential elections and needs to increase his extremely low rating of 2%. The popularity of his Liberal Party has fallen in the past six months, and its members are fleeing to another pro-Romanian rightwing party, the Liberal Democratic Party, whose rating has been growing.

Ghimpu has nowhere else to win votes because Moldova's rightwing electorate comprising intellectuals and students who identify themselves as Romanians is very stable, 20%, and has not been growing. That electorate is divided between the two parties, which reflect certain moods of society but not of its majority. This explains why Moldovans are divided over Ghimpu's decree.

The Moldovan parliament will today hear a report on the consequences of the Communist regime in the country. The agenda includes a proposal to prohibit the use of all Soviet and Communist Party symbols in the republic.

Ghimpu is expected to submit to parliament a draft law canceling the concept of the republic's nationalities policy adopted in 2003, in which Moldova was described as a polyethnic state and Russian as the dominant spoken language. That concept provoked major protests in the republic.

Valery Klimenko, leader of the socio-political movement Equality, described the developments as a rollback to the 1990s, when the Moldovan People's (Popular) Front held the power in the republic. Ghimpu was one of its leaders.

The extreme rightwing government pursued a policy that provoked an armed conflict on the Dniester, which has not been settled to this day, Klimenko said.

Bulgars and Gagauz, small ethnic groups living in compact communities in the south of Moldova, have expressed protest against the authorities' actions that are complicating relations with Russia.

The Civil Society movement said it would call people to the streets today, but the Liberals have the support of young people, who are society's most energetic part. This means that Ghimpu's decree may provoke clashes in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova.

Read More...

Summary only...

The most important thing....

[image source - a Wired story about how espionage just doesn't pay like it used to]

The headline below is correct - clearly, spies are about to become the most important thing.



Vedomosti
June 28, 2010
SECURITY IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING [translation from JRL]
At the summit in Washington: Russia is more interested in economic and technological cooperation with the US
Author: Alexei Nikolsky, Natalia Kostenko

Only four of the ten joint statements of Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama released after completion of the visit of the President of Russia to the US are connected with international security. The parties confirmed the need for ratification of the treaty on reduction of strategic offensive arms (START) signed in Prague in April and agreed to continue exchange of data about missile launches and creation of a system of global monitoring of these launches in the future and spoke "in favor of strengthening of the regime of control over conventional arms in Europe." The latter means solving of the problems related to the conventional forces in Europe treaty (CFE). Russia froze its participation in the CFE in 2007 after the new NATO members refused to ratify its modified version. The US and Russia also adopted a statement on combating of terrorism (it was decided to organize joint military exercises), on Afghanistan (transit there through Russia will be broadened) and on Kyrgyzstan (for the soonest stabilization and establishment of democracy). A source in the Russian delegation says that the statement on Kyrgyzstan means that both countries that have military bases in Kyrgyzstan will abstain from unilateral steps and will have consultations about the measures that should lead to destabilization of the situation.

Of the remaining six statements two have a humanitarian nature and four deal with economy and development of technologies, for example, entrance into WTO. The two agreements on Skolkovo signed during the visit of Medvedev are dedicated to the same topics.

According to the source in the Russian delegation, the statements in the field of security were promoted by the American party more, whereas the Russian delegation put an emphasis on economic cooperation. The source added that the US persistently proposed continuation of nuclear disarmament in the form of the measures for limitation of tactical nuclear weapons, but Moscow looked at this process more cautiously and was not sure that it would receive benefits from it.

Dean of MGIMO Ivan Safranchuk says that such attitude of Moscow is quite explainable. Security topics related to nuclear weapons and third countries like Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan have dominated in the Russian-American relations for a long time. Having adopted a course at modernization, Russia saw a different benefit in relations with the US and was not enthusiastic about a return to recalculation of warheads.

Read More...

Summary only...

The gas flap in the broader context of Belarusian-Russian relations

 [image source]

Russia-Belarus Relations at a Political 'Standoff'

Gazeta
www.gzt.ru
June 21, 2010
Article by Fedor Lukyanov: "Russia's Conscience" 
[Translation from JRL - note: see here for another comment on this story]

The latest conflict between Moscow and Minsk is no surprise to anyone, because there has already long been no trace of the "union fraternity." But the present-day opposition does not look like the previous rounds. The general context has changed, which has also influenced the logic of behavior of the parties.

The difference in Russian-Belarusian relations from Russia's relations with other neighbors consists of the fact that they were based on an economic foundation. This may seem like a paradox, because, since the late 1990's, Moscow and Minsk were specifically in a political union and practically always held identical positions on questions of foreign and domestic policy. But this alliance was predominantly declarative in nature. However, thanks to the presence of the Union State, political differences were formally removed and did not require special regulation, including with the aid of economic levers of effect (as was the case with, say, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltic countries).

The bilateral conflicts of the zero years, which were sometimes very acute, always had the same essence: Attempts to convert political unions into economic dividends. On the part of Russia, the discussion centered around acquisition of Belarusian assets that were necessary for restoration of former Soviet production chains. On the part of Belarus, the goal was to ensure maximal subsidization of the national economy on the part of Moscow. And although the outwardly transitory clashes of Russia and Belarus were reminiscent of the similar Russian-Ukrainian scenario, they did not have the political aftertaste that was characteristic of the latter.

Today, relations have taken on the nature of political opposition. Aleksandr Lukashenka openly spoke out against the Kremlin in an acute and extremely dangerous crisis: The overthrow in Kyrgyzstan and the events that followed it. Having supported Kurmanbek Bakiyev and given him the tribune of the CIS (the ex-president is speaking out in the Minsk staff headquarters of that organization), and in fact accusing Moscow of supporting the overthrow of a legitimate head of state, the Belarusian leader has cast doubt upon Russia's right to post-Soviet leadership. Moreover, this is happening at a moment when objective prerequisites have arisen for such leadership. The other subjects of big world politics are immersed in their own problems and, in essence, do not object to Moscow's sorting out all of the problems on the territory of the former USSR that everyone else has grown tired of.

In prior years, all efforts - intellectual, political-diplomatic, economic, and even military - were aimed at proving to foreign players in the West that Moscow had a predominant influence in that part of the planet. The course was crowned with success, partly because of the consequences of the world crisis, but nevertheless... And here, it turned out that there was no well thought-out plan for restoring leadership. And Lukashenka himself assumed the role of a sort of "conscience of Russia," constantly pointing out to Moscow the inconsistency and contradictory nature of its policy.

The non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was reminiscent of Russia's former position on Kosovo, which Moscow rejected in the case of Georgia. Defense of Bakiyev underscored the fact that the interim government, supported by Russia, has no legal basis, that everything that it does is, strictly speaking, unlawful, and that Moscow shares responsibility for the lawlessness. The refusal to join the Customs Union is a confirmation of the unequal nature of integration, under which the strongest partner makes too few steps toward the weaker ones. Finally, the gas conflict exposed the double standards of Russia: It opts for concessions to Kiev, which is not included in any associations with Moscow, yet makes access more difficult for Minsk, which is formally its closest ally.

Lukashenka says all this publicly, with his inherent talent and convincingness, and also rather willfully juggling the facts. Obviously, the President of Belarus is not fighting for the law and justice in general - he is building his own independent line of defense against Russian pressure by raising the stakes in case of a "big deal."

An independent line is needed because he cannot count on the support of Europe, to which Russia's opponents on the post-Soviet area usually appeal. And this is not because Batka's ("Batka" is nickname for Lukashenka, meaning "Father" - translator's note) authoritarian practice does not suit the West - it would close its eyes to this. Actually, the European Union had begun to clearly "warm up" to Minsk even before the Russian-Georgian war, and the process was accelerated after August of 2008. But the economic - and then also political - crisis of the European Union reduced its activity on the post-Soviet area to a minimum. Brussels and the capitals of the leading states clearly cannot be bothered with this now. Belarus, of course, will try to revive the European phobia against Russian energy imperialism, but the repercussions will not be comparable to the previous "gas wars." Furthermore, the volumes of transit through Belarus are many times less than through Ukraine. It is summer now, and what Europe wants most of all is not to be distracted from the battle over the euro.

Minsk evidently understands this, and so it intends to rely on its own efforts. Lukashenka is holding some trump cards. Aside from the Customs Union, which remains a key priority for Moscow, these now also include the CSTO. Russia needs this organization for legitimization of possible actions in Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus is fully capable of imposing a veto. Especially since Lukashenka's position on Bakiyev (we cannot change the status-quo) finds if not support, then at least the tacit understanding of his counterparts - Islam Karimov, Emomali Rakhmon and Nursultan Nazarbayev. All of them fear to one degree or another that, if Russia is allowed to intervene in domestic affairs, sooner or later this will also affect them.

For Moscow, the conflict with Minsk this time is also primarily political. Integration projects - the creation of the Customs Union, the strengthening of the CSTO - are attempts by Russia to use the world situation and the absence of interest of other players to stop the expansion of other centers of power (EU, China, US) on the post-Soviet area. As strange as it may seem, it is specifically Belarus that has become the main obstacle in the path of realization of this goal, especially because Lukashenka cannot be called either anyone's puppet, or a Russophobe dreamer.

Russia's relations with Belarus today are at a crossroads. It is no accident that the Russian envoy to Belarus, Ambassador Aleksandr Surikov, stated that, if Minsk refuses to join the Customs Union, Moscow may return full customs control to the border between the two countries. This is logical. The project of the Union State in the form in which it was once devised by Boris Yeltsin and Aleksandr Lukashenka has fully exhausted itself. Now there must be a qualitative change. Either this is the beginning of real step-by-step integration, which the Customs Union project envisions. Or it is a return to the fully autonomous existence, with total re-computation (deliveries, transit, duties, markets, payment for military facilities, etc.).

Then again, the second variant would be a political defeat for Russia, because it would demonstrate its inability to convince even its closest ally of the benefit of cooperation. For Belarus, this is also fraught with difficulties: Without preferential conditions and subsidies on the part of Moscow, the Belarusian economy would find itself in an extremely difficult position, and it does not have anyone in particular to count on.

The current opposition of Moscow and Minsk is a war of nerves. Russia needs to prove at any cost that it is capable of overcoming any opposition and achieving its set goals. Belarus must stake out the status of a privileged partner, with whom one must come to agreement seriously and with full respect. And the standoff continues.

(Begin boxed material) Fedor Lukyanov

Lukyanov's biography is an example of how devotion to a beloved cause becomes a guarantee of success. He began his activity in the foreign broadcast editorial office of Moscow Radio. After that, he worked at the newspaper, Segodnya, and later assumed the duties of deputy chief editor of the newspaper, Vremya Novostey. In 2002, Lukyanov headed up the journal, Russia in Global Politics. A year later, he became a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. Lukyanov has a rare hobby - political caricature of the Soviet period. (End boxed material)

Read More...

Summary only...

Resetting, Reloading and Rolling up Sleeves

 [image source]

Rossiiskaya Gazeta
June 21, 2010 [translation from JRL]
"ROLLED-UP SLEEVES" SUMMIT
An interview with Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergei Kislyak
Author: Andrei Shitov

Question: What can you say about the forthcoming Russian-American summit?
Sergei Kislyak: It is going to be an important visit indeed, the first official visit of our president to the United States. President Dmitry Medvedev visited the United States on many occasions already but they were not official visits.
     Agenda of the visit is known. The presidents will discuss a broad range of issues including arms control, of course. Still, there is more to the bilateral relations between Russia and the United States than arms control. There is a colossal potential for economic contacts. Russia's interest in innovations and advanced technologies is well known as well. I reckon that the presidents will discuss it all.

Question: The Americans sometimes call the forthcoming meeting an innovations summit...
Sergei Kislyak: Yes, this is going to be an important component of the summit. All the same, it is wrong to assume that innovations are all the presidents will be discussing.

Question: What will it be - a discourse over strategic cooperation or something more specific than that?
Sergei Kislyak: First and foremost, we have a presidential commission. Its working groups comprising ministers and deputy ministers already discuss specific projects. I'm convinced that the report on the work of the commission to be presented to the heads of states will become a solid foundation of our strategic cooperation. It is strategy that the presidents will be discussing.

Question: Will the report be published?
Sergei Kislyak: Work on the report continues and diplomats have a rule: they never make declarations on whatever is not complete yet. In any event, a good deal of information on the progress made by the commission will be made available to general public.

Question: Will any economic documents be drawn along with the report?
Sergei Kislyak: Some points will be made but I cannot say in what form, yet. It might be a joint statement, for example.

Question: What about political documents then?
Sergei Kislyak: Not every summit inevitably ends in adoption of some major document, you know. The presidents seem to trust each other which is fine. It enables them to listen to each other and to pool efforts rather than work at cross purposes. It is more than an exchange of opinions. It sets the tone and atmosphere of political relations between our countries.

Question: Well, perhaps, you could say something more definite about the expected results of the summit?
Sergei Kislyak: Lots of matters are on the agenda. Some of them will be addressed and solved, others will not. There are traditional items like nonproliferation and war on terrorism, there are others that are important too. There are no rules saying that every summit ought to end in a joint statement on every item on the agenda. What counts is that work continues. We would like to see the Americans participating in innovation programs in Russia, and I hope that the summit will encourage it.
     There are trade talks as well. It will be wrong to assume that they will be concluded in time for the summit. Work continues. In any event, it is going to be a working summit meaning that the presidents will be addressing genuine problems rather than going through the motions for the benefit of public relations.

Question: How would you appraise the current state of the Russian-American relations?
Sergei Kislyak: I came to the United States after the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia. Relations between our countries at that time were probably the worst ever since the end of the Cold War.
     The new Administration came to the White House with its own views on international affairs and, among them, relations with Russia. The situation started changing, and changing fast. Barack Obama suggested a "reload" and he meant it. So did we, for that matter. It is hardly surprising of course considering common challenges Russia and the United States are facing. The "reload" is bearing fruit already. Our relations are more sincere now. Our counties listen to each other.
     It does not mean, of course, that we always agree with each other. We do not. What counts, however, is that we discuss whatever we disagree on in a civilized manner.

Question: Does the term "reload" really apply to what is happening in the bilateral relations?
Sergei Kislyak: It was perfect once, when it was necessary to extricate our relations from the tight corner they had been in. The way I see it, the period of "reload" is over now. I'd say that what we are doing now is establishing solid partnership.

Question: What changes in the American approach are particularly important to Russia?
Sergei Kislyak: Signing of the START treaty was quite important an event. It is not the reduction as such that really matters. What matters is that this document demonstrates cooperation between Russia and the United States in strategic stability maintenance. It was made plain by the very nature of the talks and their atmosphere. I hope that both signatories will ratify the document soon.
     Readiness of the US Administration to take an unbiased look at the American ballistic missile defense system in Europe is also important. What Washington intends to develop in Europe causes no concerns. Military clarity and stability along our borders improved some. Anyway, the Cold War is over and I do not think that it will ever return.

Question: Has the Russian diplomacy responded to changes in the U.S. policy?
Sergei Kislyak: But of course. We took the "reload" seriously and backed our resolve with specific decisions and programs. Our American colleagues were permitted to ferry their military to Afghanistan via Russia. This is something that would have appeared impossible only recently. We are thinking at this point over what else we can do to help the Americans because a lot of matters that have an effect on our security are related to Afghanistan.
     I do not think that our attitude toward America changed greatly from what we were prepared to do for it in the past. I'd say that the Americans finally saw the error of their ways and began working on amelioration of our relations.

Question: Are there issues Russia and the United States prefer to stay away from?
Sergei Kislyak: As I said already, we do not agree on absolutely everything. South Ossetia is one such issue. Predictable security of Europe is another. The Americans like to give us chapter and verse on democracy. On the other hand, they themselves are not exactly lily-white from the standpoint of human rights.
     No, I do not think that there are any issues our countries are afraid to approach. There are issues that are priorities because they are important for both our countries.

Read More...

Summary only...

Suspicion of the Westward Turn

 Given their partner publications, perhaps the tone of this Vedomosti editorial shouldn't be surprising.

[image source]

Website Fears Russia's 'Turn West' Aimed at Preserving 'Corrupt' System
Vedomosti
www.vedomosti.ru
May 26, 2010
Editorial: "Turn West" (Translation courtesy of JRL)

The modernization of Russia declared by the country's first person dictates fundamental changes in foreign policy. A number of events confirm that Moscow is abandoning the fat years' great power arrogance and isolationism and striving for full-fledged cooperation with the West.

It seems that Russian politicians are striving for more trusting relations and, in the future, even for integration with Europe. For example, the recent warming of relations between Moscow and Warsaw is connected not only to the personal sympathies of the premiers and the catastrophe involving Poland's aircraft No. 1 near Smolensk. The tone itself of foreign policy speeches and documents has changed. The participation in the 9 May Victory Parade in Red Square by NATO country military units and its conclusion with Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" -- united Europe's anthem -- are symbols confirming the trend.

The "Program for Effective Use of Foreign Policy Factors for Purposes of Russia's Long-term Development" published the in the magazine Russkiy Newsweek (the document's authenticity is confirmed by experts and the lack of the MID's (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) denials) must not be considered as our response to American President Barack Obama's new international strategy. The program, however, suggests a very substantial tactical correction. The understanding that "reinforcing relations of interdependence with leading world and regional powers . . . including the creation of 'modernization alliances' with our main West European partners and with the European Union as a whole" will help Russia emerge from the crisis has arrived to replace self-satisfied statements about an "island of stability."

Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov is talking about the need for political rapprochement with advanced countries. In the article "The Euro-Atlantic: Equal Security for All" published the other day in the French magazine Defence Nationale, the minister emphasized that our country "is an integral part of Europe" and pointed out that "the philosophy of joint work lies at the foundation of Russia's foreign policy." Yet another key of the article is that Russia will not get into confrontation with the West and when necessary will wait while "natural processes create the conditions for convergence at the level of assessments and practical policy."

Two reasons caused the changes in Russian foreign policy. Europe and the US agreed to take Russia's interests in the post-Soviet space into greater consideration. Simultaneously, they recognized in the Kremlin that they will not succeed in modernizing the Russian economy using their own efforts and resources. Adults posing as an offended adolescent -- this is not the best way to attract western investments and technologies. And this means that political trust is needed.

It is another matter that closer relations with Europe and the US may lead to ambiguous consequences for Russia and, speaking broadly, for the post-Soviet space. The problem is in the understanding of the term "convergence," meaning rapprochement of different economic and political systems, and the degree of this rapprochement. Convergence with the European Union, of which Lavrov spoke, may accelerate the creation in Russia of European institutions -- the supremacy of the law, the independence of the courts, and the inviolability of private property.

There is, though, reason to fear that part of the Russian establishment views the future "European choice" exclusively as the state and major corporations' free access to Western technologies and credit lines, as the possibility of one's own going about Europe without a visa, buying real estate, and maintaining high standards of consumption. Moscow probably is trying to use cooperation with Europe in order to, by attracting resources and technologies, preserve the present system: clannishness, corruption, and access to resources through the electoral system.

Read More...

Summary only...