Russia in the English-language weeklies

Masha Gessen has an excellent piece in The New Republic about the Orange Revolution's implications for the Russian political scene:

...the message for anti-Putin Russians was less encouraging. The miracle cannot be repeated in Russia, not only because of the cowed Russian media but also because Russia no longer has an independent judiciary, such as Ukraine's, capable of upholding the rule of law. Indeed, the Kremlin has recently staged what amounts to a series of rigged show trials--most prominently of oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkhovsky and of two scholars convicted of high treason despite virtually no evidence against them. In these and other cases, the Russian courts, which had gone through some reform in the 1990s, have been returned to their roles as Kremlin helpers. The courts have been intimidated into submission, and judicial leadership has been stacked with appointees close to Putin. The Russian president has recently even unveiled plans to do away with any pretense of judicial independence altogether by eliminating judicial confirmation.

Kuchma may have wanted to neuter Ukraine's courts as well, but he never had the capability, or the media backing, to do so. But at least Russians are now likely to have a nice place to flee to should things get really bad. Until, that is, Ukraine joins the European Union and closes its border to the East.

And the Economist is none too optimistic, either, about goings-on in Putin's Russia, vis a vis the situation in Ukraine and otherwise:

As the tide moves towards a presidential election victory for the opposition leader, Victor Yushchenko, on December 26th, the efforts of Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, to thwart him have looked ever more cack-handed. But they have also depressed those who still hoped that Mr Putin's Russia might move, slowly and tortuously, on to a path leading to political liberalism—and that he might prove an ally not a foe of the West.

As if Russia's intervention in Ukraine were not enough, the Kremlin's anti-western rhetoric has also risen. In an excess of hypocrisy even by Soviet standards, Mr Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have accused the West of meddling in Ukraine in order to destabilise the region (see article).

The conclusion is inescapable. Far from being a political and economic reformer who runs an admittedly flawed but still recognisable democracy, Mr Putin has become an obstacle to change who is in charge of an ill-managed autocracy. The question is, what can the West do about it?
The short answer is, not much. However ineffectual Mr Putin's foreign policy looks after Ukraine, his authority at home is unchallenged. Indeed, there is now talk of his finding some way to run for a third term in office (see article). Moreover, compared with the Yeltsin period, when Russia depended on the IMF, the West has few economic or financial levers to pull. Instead, its growing dependence on Russian energy may actually be putting some levers into the Kremlin's hands.

Even so, firm recognition that Mr Putin is going in the wrong direction is much better than meek acquiescence. Western leaders have been encouragingly robust over Ukraine, rebutting Mr Putin's moans of interference. They can do more to help pro-democracy forces in Russia, especially the non-governmental organisations that are increasingly being harassed. They should extend no favours to Russia in its negotiations to join the World Trade Organisation; nor should they indulge Mr Putin as he prepares to preside over the G8 summit in Moscow in 2006. It may not be time to talk of a new cold war—Russia is not the threat that the Soviet Union was. But it is time to see Mr Putin as a challenger, and not a friend.

"Cack-handed," indeed. Those British brothers are telling it like it is.