The good people at Transitions Online (TOL) seem to have set up a number of blogs. I was especially delighted to find one which was started relatively recently - Steady State, a "group blog about unresolved conflicts in the former Soviet space." So far, there seems to be just one person posting, but the content is good, especially since as far as I know there is no other English-language blog focusing on the post-Soviet conflicts (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria). And while there's nothing as of yet on the blog's "about" page to tell us about the author, they seem to know what they're talking about.
I have actually thought about starting such a blog for some time - the so-called "frozen conflicts" are really fascinating as you learn more about them, as I've been doing during this academic year; and until the last year or so they had been almost totally forgotten by the English-speaking world. I could even just use this blog - "Scraps of Moscow" would in some ways be a perfect name for a blog about these territories, what with their close ties to Russia. But I didn't want to get such a narrow focus and have to write regularly about issues that are so very politicized. Anyway, I'm glad TOL is doing it and look forward to reading more.
One post I found at Steady State links to a riveting - to me, anyway - video documenting a dialogue between two men who had been colleagues before the war: a Georgian displaced by the ethnic cleansing to Tbilisi and an Abkhaz who remained in Sukhumi. They were connected with videoconferencing equipment and had a series of tense and emotional conversations. The first 20 minutes or so of the 48-minute video have English subtitles, including brief video tours of both Sukhumi and Tbilisi. Worth watching if you are interested in this conflict.
Sunday, April 01, 2007
New blog that's right up my alley
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5 comments:
Hey Lyndon, did you see today's EDM post arguing that Kosovo could be added to Russia's list of frozen conflicts?
I also find the subject fascinating, I hope you find room to do some blogging about it, as it certainly merits greater attention.
http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372067
James
editor
www.robertamsterdam.com
James, thanks for posting the link. I get EDM and value it highly, although it often has to be taken with a spoonful of salt. I have seen Socor speak in DC about the secessionist regions in Georgia, and one of the things he was adamant about was that there should be no linkage between the post-Soviet conflicts and Kosovo.
To be honest, although I know it's important for the bigger picture, whenever I see people writing about Kosovo my eyes glaze over just a bit. Each of these conflicts is different, and each of them should have a unique resolution. This is true not just as between the post-Soviet conflicts but among various such conflicts worldwide (Cyprus, Taiwan, etc.).
So while the talk about a "Kosovo precedent" is important for those trying to decipher whether or when Russia might be willing to sell its secessionist pals down the river and may turn out to be decisive if these disputed areas are settled with some sort of geopolitical barter, I hope it doesn't go down that way and am not convinced it will.
While Russia has been pretty consistent in advocating a "Kosovo precedent," the idea has been rejected in at least one recent Lavrov speech (to the Duma, mentioned in passing here). EDM is the best English-language source for this, also IWPR (which has more of a micro focus on the Georgian regions) and perhaps this new TOL blog. And JRL has pieces fairly frequently. Regnum actually has dedicated pages to each of the four post-Soviet secessionist areas (find them in the list on the left-hand side here), although (while they may be reputable on some topics and I've been told that the NY Times uses their wire to stay up on events) they are known to sometimes propagate disinformation on issues connected with the so-called "frozen conflicts."
Unfortunately, EDM's search function is not very user-friendly, but I was able to find this two part series from a year ago in which Socor provides his debunking of the "Kosovo precedent" idea.
I guess I just always come back to the point that each of these regions is unique, and while I know conflict resolution (especially with such small and relatively peripheral conflicts - small and peripheral to just about everyone but the people who live there and the small countries they affect) takes place in a an imperfect world, I'd like to think that the people working on this will not allow some sort of bargain to be struck without looking at the specifics of each case.
I hope to blog more about these "de facto states" in the future, so it's good to hear that at least one other person out there is interested.
I am glad you liked the blog content, thanks. Hopefully more bloggers will be interested to join.
To follow up on your discussion: Russia's consistency in propagating the "Kosovo precedent" is either a blunder or a way for Moscow to try and get something out of the Kosovo irreversible independence.
Russia is traditionally a strong supporter of the principle of the territorial integrity, mainly because there are many potential claimers inside Russia proper (ex. North Caucasus). On the other hand, they know they lost the showdown with the West over whole Yugoslav adventure and what they want is to benefit somehow - maybe get the Western countries to withdraw their support from Georgia.
In fact, Russia doesn't know what to do with these conflicts: they can't recognize them as there might emerge "frozen conflict" precedent for their own potential secessionists; they can't just absorb those territories into Russia (as much as some radicals want it) as it would clearly be the case of territorial annexation.
At the same time these conflicts ensure that Russia retains foreign policy leverage over its former Union Republics. The separatist statelets are of course aware that Russia is primarily interested to use them for its own purpose, but they really don't have any other choice than to try and influence Russia in some way, and hope for the best. This can be clearly seen how the separatist leaders react to Georgia's accession to NATO.
It’s true that every conflict is unique and a principled approach would be hard to maintain, but at the same time, this could mean arbitrary settlement of conflicts which might give raise to even more historical injustices. Let’s take Georgia for example: the international community thinks that the solution to the conflicts should be principled in Georgia’s territorial integrity, primarily because Georgia is recognized along those borders. But if one takes into account the Abkhaz and Ossetian point of view, then they see their inclusion into Georgia as USSR’s artificial creation and there is no reason why they should suffer from someone’s idea to live inside Georgia forever, besides they won the war for their independence in the beginning of the 90’s.
At the same time, picture becomes even more complex when one raises the issue of return of Georgian refugees – if they all return to Abkhazia, they would constitute a majority. So how would you settle a conflict where majority wants to be in one country and minority that has already won the war wants independence?
But… Kosovo principle cannot be applicable to the former Soviet states – circumstances were completely different and nature of the conflicts is different as well. I don’t even know how a Kosovo precedent would look like – independence to South Ossetia, an unviable state? Or to Transnistria because some immigrants from Russia where able to destabilize Moldova? Or recognize Abkhazia and thus reward ethnic cleansing? All this would provide very wrong incentive for those minorities who would want to have independence.
Anyhow, it takes a lot to disentangle these issues, and for a very long time it will not be possible.
I don’t even know how a Kosovo precedent would look like – independence to South Ossetia, an unviable state? Or to Transnistria because some immigrants from Russia where able to destabilize Moldova? Or recognize Abkhazia and thus reward ethnic cleansing?
Those succinct descriptions sum up excellently the argument for each of these situations having its own individual solution. To quote someone who's been involved in one of the conflict resolution processes and is now teaching about it, "Each is unhappy in its own way..." - paraphrasing Tolstoy, of course. So of course there should be no Kosovo precedent or "principle," because the histories of these conflicts - and their present situations (Kosovo with international involvement versus the former Soviet conflicts with virtually exclusively Russian involvement on the ground) - are entirely distinct.
I actually think you can see a correlation between Russia's internal perception of having "solved" the problem in Chechnya and its willingness to promote the secessionist regimes.
Recall that in the 1990's Russia was (at least officially) participating in a blockade of Abkhazia, for example, and I believe Russia's statements from that era about territorial integrity were much more heartfelt. This was also the era in which other subjects of the Russian Federation were experimenting with high levels of sovereignty (e.g., Tatarstan). Since Putin constructed his vertical of power and at least outwardly pacified Chechnya, it would appear that Russia is less concerned about its own secessionist problems than it was in the '90's.
But you are right, Russia is still not going to go as far as to recognize the "NATO-2" (Jibs, I'm sure you've heard this before, but for others: Nagorno-Karabagh, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and South Ossetia) statelets or annex them - because of their own North Caucasus issues and because I think they are still at least a bit sensitive to international opinion on such issues.
Socor looks to be correct in his observation that Russia - for now - seeks to either keep them in limbo or have them reintegrated into the metropolitan states in such a way as to give the reintegrated secessionists veto power over NATO membership or Europeanization. That was the crux of the Kozak Memorandum, in any event.
I am curious that in your analysis you don't mention NK - I have always felt that it was an outlier among the four, because while Russian support was important the the Armenians, it was not as overt as in the other cases, and Russia doesn't seem to have as much of a stake in it as it does in the others.
On the other hand, you could make a case for each of the other ones being "unique" also - Transnistria is the one where ethnicity and ethno-nationalism matters the least (also the least violent, perhaps not coincidentally) and economic interests mattered the most; Abkhazia is the one that would seem to be the most potentially viable as an independent state (not that I'm advocating that) because it is not landlocked and has the tourism industry - not to mention tangerines - as a revenue source; and S. Ossetia is the least viable one because of its size and location.
But what do you think about NK? Is a land-swap really a possibility there? Apparently they were very close to agreeing on one at some point in the past, but what about now?
"it would appear that Russia is less concerned about its own secessionist problems than it was in the '90's".
This is very true, because the memories of Russia on its knees seem very distant to Russia's leadership today - but, history is full with unexpected eruptions of some seemingly inapplicable principles (take for instance the concept of 'self-determination' - that the World War I victors were propagating for the remnants of the fallen empires without seeing parallels for themselves; eventually the ideas would turn against them). Anyhow, Russia's disintegration at the moment is hard to imagine, but acknowledgement of the right to secession of formal unit of USSR could be a helpful tool for those who would want to separate from Russia in the future.
As for the NK, it is a bit different from others as Russia’s support is not direct at least – very recently Russia declared that they would accept any decision as long as both countries agreed. In a sense, NK for Russia is important, but it’s almost not their fight although they have their dog there.
As for the land swap – the reports sound contradictory – it seems there is a progress, but then next day there war of words. What is more annoying is that they schedule the bilateral meetings once in a few months – and conclusions are usually one step from settlement – I hope that last step is not the status…
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