The Russophobia Scarecrow

My comments on a commentary piece from today's Moscow Times:

The Russophobia Card
by Andrei Tsygankov
Moscow Times, April 3, 2008

The U.S. presidential candidates are increasingly playing the Russophobia card in their campaigns. In addressing Russia, Senators John McCain and Hillary Clinton have resorted to insulting President Vladimir Putin as a KGB spy who has no soul.

The first mistake in the column is an understandable but important one - substituting Putin for Russia. As Anders Aslund has recently noted, taking a dim view of the former does not have to mean one has given up hope for the latter.

After all, the harsh criticism to which Tsygankov refers has been chiefly of Putin and his signature style - and is it really surprising that individuals who are vying for the votes of American citizens would criticize someone who has sought to score political points internationally and at home by employing anti-American rhetoric? Furthermore, while McCain's criticism of Russia has been something of a minor campaign theme, one can discount this at least a bit if one recalls that one of McCain's main goals at this stage is to differentiate his approach to the world from George Bush's in the eyes of the voters. As for the implication that Hillary has been "increasingly" talking about Russia in any way whatsoever, I believe that's simply not the case.

Ironically, Tsygankov actually seems to be accusing McCain and Clinton of filching a page from Putin's campaign playbook. In making the largely unsupportable statement that "[t]he U.S. presidential candidates are increasingly playing the Russophobia card in their campaigns," he seems to be suggesting an atmosphere which is the mirror image of the crescendo of anti-Americanism which accompanied Russia's recent Duma and Presidential elections.

Russophobia is truly back into fashion, as Senator Joseph Biden admitted last week in a comment published in The Wall Street Journal.

That is an interesting gloss on Biden's column, which actually observed that "[b]y suppressing dissent, fueling suspicion of the West, and bullying smaller neighbors, the Putin administration has managed to undermine Moscow's prestige and bring Russophobia back into fashion." Far from being the reluctant admission of Russophobia implied by Tsygankov, Biden's column was at least the second in the last month to appear in a major American newspaper with proposals on how to improve the bilateral relationship - and, more importantly, acknowledging that "[w]hatever the American strategy has been, it clearly isn't working." This suggests that – rather than the environment of rampant Russophobia implied by Tsygankov – the American establishment’s thinking on Russia can be characterized by a growing recognition that each side bears some of the blame for the dysfunctional relationship and that a search for new solutions is necessary, but that an optimistic approach to the future is still possible.

The attacks on Putin and President-elect Dmitry Medvedev are widely supported in mainstream U.S. media. This demagoguery also extends to scholarly publications, such as "The New Cold War" by Edward Lucas, who claims that "Russia's vengeful, xenophobic and ruthless rulers have turned the sick man of Europe into a menacing bully." Just published, the book is getting a lot of publicity and is treated as a serious treatise by influential organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations.

I think it's more accurate to say that Lucas's book is being received as what it is - long-form journalism with elements of contemporary history and analysis, an editorial slant that's easy to oversimplify, and footnotes. Here is what Lucas himself said about his book:

"I'm absolutely not saying that the old Cold War is coming back. That had three dimensions. You mentioned military, ideology -- and it was global confrontation -- this one isn't -- and the Soviet Union then was a closed society. Russia is now very well integrated inter -- both world diplomatic structures and of course the economy and constant human contact. I'm absolutely not making that argument nor am I saying that Putin is a new Stalin. That would be grotesquely exaggerated.

But what I am saying is that we have been much too complacent, for a start, about both where Russia is -- has already got to and what the trajectory is -- that it sort of creeps up on us and things that seemed unimaginable then became isolated exceptions, then become -- happening rather more often and then suddenly become part of everyday life in Putin's Russia, and this has really been extremely troubling and so one thing I want to do is just give a wakeup call."

To be fair, I have heard Lucas compare Putin's rule to that of Hitler. But consider that in the Anglo-American world it is people like Lucas who make such statements about Russia, whereas in the Russian-speaking world it is people like Putin and members of his administration who make similar statements about America (this is, of course, in addition to the gaggle of reflexively anti-American commentators who receive top billing in the Russian media). And in his column about the supposed rise of American Russophobia, Tsygankov neglects to mention the fact that Lucas, um, isn't American.

Despite the anti-Russia rhetoric, many U.S. politicians feel that Russia doesn't matter in the global arena. Instead, they are preoccupied with other international issues, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. But Russia should matter, particularly in a world of new security threats and growing energy competition. The attitude of ignorance and self-righteousness toward Russia tells us volumes about the U.S. unpreparedness for the central challenges of the 21st century.

Tsygankov criticizes American political and media elites for their ignorant and arrogant approach to Russia. I don’t disagree with his assertions in this regard, but I don’t understand how Americans applying an approach to Russia which is sadly typical of the American approach to all foreign lands adds up to "Russophobia." Unfortunately, it has often seemed that simple neglect and short-sightedness have been to blame for America’s policy missteps with regard to Russia, rather than the sort of anti-Russian conspiracy suggested by Tsygankov. And when Russia's head of state goes out of his way to be stridently anti-American in his public statements, is it any wonder that Americans who are not specialists in foreign relations – and even some who are – fail to see how the U.S.-Russian relationship could actually be a fruitful one for both sides?

Then Tsygankov ranges dangerously close to the realm of unhinged conspiracy theorists:

Russophobia's revival is indicative of the fear shared by some U.S. and European politicians that their grand plans to control the world's most precious resources and geostrategic sites may not succeed if Russia's economic and political recovery continues.

I never know how to respond to statements like this. It's like trying to convince a small child that there aren't any monsters under the bed. If someone really believes this sort of thing, they won't be convinced otherwise.

One Russophobic group, exemplified by McCain, includes military hawks or advocates of U.S. hegemony who fought the Cold War not to contain the Soviet enemy but to destroy it by all means available.

This comment at Russia Blog suggests that more sensible responses to McCain's Russia policy are possible than simply waving in the direction of his team's Cold War vintage.

The second group is made up of "liberal hawks" who have gotten comfortable with the weakened and submissive Russia of the 1990s. They have an agenda of promoting U.S.-style democracy and market economy. The fact that the Soviet threat no longer exists has only strengthened their sense of superiority.

To be honest, I don't relish the idea of the McCainiac approach to Russia becoming U.S. policy, and I have concerns about the potential for a "back to the future" scenario under Obama (advised on Russia by Michael McFaul, who can sort of be seen as an embodiment of America's 1990s approach to Russia) or Clinton (the name says it all). But does Tsygankov really think that Obama himself, for example, really noticed or "got[] comfortable with" a weak and submissive Russia in the 1990s, before he was even in the Senate?

Finally there are lobbyists representing East European nationalists who have worked in concert with ruling elites of East and Central European nations to oppose Russia's state consolidation of power as well as promote NATO expansion, deployment of elements of a U.S. missile-defense system in Poland and Czech Republic, and energy pipelines circumventing Russia. These groups have diverse but compatible objectives of isolating Russia from European and U.S. institutions. Because of a lack of commitment to a strong relationship with Russia in the White House, a largely uninformed public and the absence of a Russian lobby within the United States, the influence that these groups exert on policymaking has been notable.

All that's missing is a mention of the Captive Nations Committee, a favorite bugbear of those who believe Russia is forever being needlessly maligned by malevolent busybodies of East European ethnicity based in Washington. Actually, snarkiness aside, I tend to agree with Tsygankov that the relatively rapid NATO expansion of the 1990s and since represented a triumph of interest group politics over what should have been seen as one of the U.S.'s overriding national interests - a cordial relationship with Russia.

Interestingly, Tsygankov laments the lack of a Russia lobby in the U.S. but does not note the cause. In Alexei Pankin's words, "People inside the Russian president’s administration or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose professional duty makes them responsible for shaping Russia’s image" display "the distinctive characteristic of the current regime’s mentality, utterly suspicious of independent initiatives and those who are not asking for money but offering all kinds of opportunities. It freely allocates funds as a form of reward for some sort of service to the administration, but not a means to achieve a goal." The ineffectual attempts to create a Russia lobby showcase the downside of having the unbridled accumulation of personal wealth as a substitute for a national idea.

Russophobia is not in U.S. national interests and is not supported by the American public. Various polls demonstrate that Americans do not agree with the assessment that Russia is a threat to the United States' values and interests. A recent BBC World Service poll revealed, for example, that 45 percent of Americans have a mainly positive attitude regarding Russia's influence in the world, compared with 36 percent who have a mainly negative attitude.

I couldn't agree more. This suggests, though, that Tsygankov's concern may be misplaced and that Americans don't actually listen too closely to what our presidential candidates say about issues like Russia policy. And why should we? It's not as though most Americans decide who to vote for based on foreign policy issues, with the notable exception of Iraq.

Yet Russophobia-driven groups have generally succeeded in feeding the media an image of Russia as an increasingly dangerous regime.

I can imagine which groups Tsygankov has in mind; still, this sentence might have been more convincing if he had named some of them. More likely, he didn't name them because - in any context other than a column in a Moscow newspaper read by people whose interests center on Russia - suggesting that groups with worldwide activities like Freedom House, RFE/RL, Reporters Without Borders, CEIP, and Heritage, all of which are sometimes accused of fanning the flames of Russophobia, are motivated in large part by an irrational fear of Russia (which is, after all, what "Russophobia" means) would be ludicrous.

Thousands of reports in the mainstream U.S. media implicate the Kremlin and Putin personally in murdering opposition journalists and defected spies. Only a handful of reports in less prominent outlets question such interpretations.

"Thousands"? That is an assertion that cries out for substantiation. Reports offering a more positive take on the Putin years - or at least a sober explanation of his popularity - only appear in "less prominent outlets"? That must be news to the New York Times.

Although it matters greatly which candidate will enter the White House in November, the more important issue is whether there will be a fundamental psychological adjustment in Washington away from Russophobia.

To be sure, the healing of the U.S. Russophobic mindframe is going to require a lot of time. Winston Churchill once commented that U.S. politicians "always do the right thing in the end. They just like to exhaust all the alternatives first." If this indeed is the case, we will not see a framework for meaningful cooperation with Russia any time soon.

Here, our columnist quite simply has things backwards. No matter who is elected president, "Russophobia" will not be a major plank in their campaign platform, nor is it quite the major element of the DC zeitgeist that Tsygankov suggests. Even McCain could be expected, optimistically, to allow cooler heads to prevail and avoid sudden moves. Anti-Americanism in Russia, on the other hand, is a defining characteristic of the country's foreign policy and was a key element of Putin's campaign appearances on behalf of United Russia. So, assuming Tsygankov is talking about what matters for the U.S.-Russia relationship, healing would seem to be more urgently needed in Moscow than in Washington.

I found this column disturbing enough to be worthy of such a lengthy response because it appears in the Moscow Times at a moment when the bilateral relationship appears to be at a fork in the road, and some in Moscow may believe that Tsygankov's kaleidoscope - in which isolated critical comments about Putin by McCain and Clinton are multiplied by reflection into a full-blown campaign of "increasing" Russophobia - is a valid lens through which to view the American political and media scene, which could bolster the arguments of those in Russia who would prefer to prolong the nostalgia-inducing atmosphere of Cold-War-style posturing which has gone on for too long already.

As a linguistic aside, it is interesting to note the origin of the phrase chosen for the title of this column (whether by its author or by the MT opinion-page editor). According to Wikipedia, "In the first, and more common context," an accusation of "playing the race card" "alleges that someone has falsely accused another person of being a racist in order to gain some sort of advantage." Since accusations of Russophobia are often trotted out in an effort to deflect attention from legitimate criticism of Russian policies, the title seems unintentionally apt.