More on my favorite topic

I heard an extensive and pretty even-handed report about Abkhazia on NPR's Morning Edition today. I guess that means it's finally "arrived" as a mainstream news topic - that, or they are trying to inform their listeners before open hostilities break out there.

In the meantime, I've been reorganizing some of my old books* which have been languishing in boxes since we moved back to DC from Moscow - the reorganization is in preparation for our move later this year to London, although we won't be taking these books with us. Before re-boxing them, I took some quick photos of a few of the books and the maps of the region therein which might be of interest to Caucasophiles (photos are of book covers and then one map from each of the books):

Caucasus Travel Guide, c. 1929

Schematic map of agriculture, industry, oil pipelines,
electrification, and railroads planned and under construction

Georgian Military Highway, 1925

Map of the Transcaucasian SFSR

Abkhazian Alps, 1930

Schematic map of the eastern portion of the Black Sea coast

* Please note that all of these books were exported from Russia with the appropriate permission from the Ministry of Culture!

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Pondering the prospects for a post-Putin "perestroika"

[image source]

I found this article fascinating - hopeful and yet pessimistic at the same time, it perhaps relies too much on comparisons with the USSR and makes a conclusion that may be too bold. But its author, an emigre sociologist and a long-time and prolific commentator on life and public opinion in the USSR and Russia, makes a number of important points in arriving at that conclusion.

Johnson's Russia List
27 May 2008
How the new Russian President could start a new Perestroika with friendly trips to the capitals of neighboring countries
By Vladimir Shlapentokh
Michigan State University

[...]

[M]aintaining the image of the world as an enemy of Russia is a crucial way to legitimize current regime, along with the political stability in the country. The imperial ideology exploits the nostalgia of many Russians for the great empire and abets nationalism. It pits the population against foreign countries, treating them as hostile toward Russia and its integrity, and as working against the restoration of the country’s previous geopolitical role. In order to maintain a climate of patriotic agitation and divert the people from the country’s real problems, Russian politicians and journalists talk incessantly about “great Russia,” “Russia’s great past,” and “the great victory in 1945.” It is remarkable that, on the official site of the Russian president (2000-2007), the adjective “great” was mentioned more than 3000 times.

The practicality of the imperial ideology is seen in the fact that up to 85 percent of the population, according to a survey by the BBC at the beginning of 2008, responded positively, in one way or another, to the xenophobic propaganda of the Kremlin and its foreign policy. In fact, the ruling elite do not possess other ideological ways to influence the minds of most Russians. Alternative ideological fundamentals, such as private property and the market economy (in April 2008, Medvedev underscored their importance for Russia), are not attractive at all to the majority of the population, which hates the corrupt bureaucrats and their illegal fortunes. Only 10 percent of the population, according to a survey by Levada’s polling firm conducted in November 2007, declared that they “respect people who became rich in the last 10-15 years.”

Only the imperial ideology allowed the Kremlin to pursue its deeply antidemocratic domestic policy and disregard the growing social inequality in the country. This ideology justifies the supremacy of the “national leader” and the mistreatment of democratic institutions. It presents the members of the opposition as almost foreign agents and makes it impossible for Western organizations, such as the British Council, to function in Russia. It justifies the rude intervention of the state in the activities of foreign companies, such as British Petroleum, which cannot protect their interests against Russian competitors. It helps persecute the Protestant Church in Russia as an American agent. The imperial ideology also treats Stalin as its main hero and maintains his positive image by silencing the media’s coverage of the mass terror in Soviet times.

In fact, the imperial ideology is only meant for a domestic audience and its influence on the relations with foreign countries is rather limited. The case involving the USA is typical. During the parliamentary (December 2007) and presidential (March 2008) elections, the volume of anti-American propaganda was extremely high. However, this propaganda did relatively little to deteriorate the relations between the two countries and in no way prevented the cordial meeting between Bush and Putin in Sochi where they, like a loving couple, went to see the sunset on the Black Sea on March 27.

In order to restart Russia’s move toward democracy, it is vitally important to break the spine of the imperial ideology. Germany and Japan, after the war, would not have been able to take the road toward democracy without a resolute and consistent rejection of the ideology of supremacy, militarism and expansionism.

The most peculiar fact is that a radical change of foreign policy is much easier than doing the same in domestic affairs. This is exactly what should be on Medvedev’s mind, if he wishes to be a liberal and not one of Putin’s clones. Medvedev seemingly understands the danger of using “greatness” as the central postulate of the official ideology. In April 2008, Nikolai Svanidze, a known Russian journalist, asked Medvedev, “What does great Russia mean to you?” Putin’s heir answered, “Russia, without doubt, is a great country.” However, he then called upon the Russians “not to be intoxicated” with the idea of “greatness” and to look soberly at the real position of Russia in the world.

Many liberals are waiting for the release from prison of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an oligarch jailed by Putin for his political ambitions. However, Medvedev would have a more difficult time releasing Khodorkovsky than attacking the imperial ideology. As a matter of fact, liberalizations in post-Stalin Russia began in this area. Even before Khrushchev’s famous speech about Stalin’s atrocities at the Twentieth Party Congress, he proclaimed a policy of peaceful coexistence and undertook a number of actions that radically changed Soviet foreign policy. He was instrumental in the achievement of the armistice in Korea in 1953 and the peace in Indochina in 1954. Then, in 1955, he made a trip to Yugoslavia and apologized for Stalin’s policy toward this country and its leader Josip Tito. Then (still in 1955 and before “the thaw”) he reduced the Soviet army.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign deeds also preceded his domestic liberal policy. Before the Soviet people and the world understood Gorbachev’s democratic intentions, which did not become clear until 1987, the new Soviet leader met with Reagan in November 1985, only a few months after his ascension to power. This meeting marked the beginning of the warming of relations between the two superpowers. It was followed by a new meeting with the American president in the next year in Reykjavik. By 1987, the USSR and USA prepared a treaty on the elimination of short- and middle-range missiles.

The experiences of Khrushchev and Gorbachev might serve as a playbook for the new president, if he had the guts to turn toward the democratic road. In fact, the major obstacle to democratization is the Kremlin’s support for the imperial and nationalist ideology.

Ironically, the key element of the imperial ideology and Russian foreign policy that should be attacked by a new reformer is not the animosity against the West, the USA or Europe. The hatred of Russia’s neighboring countries (the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia, and former satellites such as Poland) plays a much more important role today. For instance, in April­May 2008, Russian media talked much more about the perfidious Georgia than England, which now, after the Litvinenko case, is also treated as a committed enemy of Russia. What is more, the media talked about Georgia almost as much as it did about NATO, which is seen as another one of the country’s fierce enemies. Indeed, between April 21 and May 22 , Georgia was mentioned almost 590 in 50 major Russian newspapers; England was mentioned 420 times and NATO 425 . The Kremlin’s aggressiveness toward the neighboring countries is a major source of friction between it and the West, which became apparent at the Bucharest meeting of NATO in April 2008.

Many experts in Russia and the West believe that the imperial ideology is deeply rooted in the Russian mind. Of course, the traditions of the country’s political culture, with its authoritarianism and xenophobia, are quite strong. However, the impact of the media on the Russians is much stronger. Khrushchev easily and almost instantly transformed public attitudes toward Tito’s Yugoslavia, a “fascist country,” from deep hostility to friendliness. President Reagan was vilified by the Soviet media in all possible ways from the moment of his inauguration in January 1981. However, when he came to Moscow as Gorbachev’s guest in May 1988 (I was there and watched it myself), he was greeted by ordinary people and intellectuals with great joy.

It would be easier for the Kremlin to redirect the media away from its hostility toward the Ukraine and Georgia than make the judicial system honest and independent. If president Medvedev decided to “reboot” the Russian political process, he would have to go on friendly visits to the capitals of all neighboring countries, starting with Kiev and Tbilisi. These visits would be as historically important as Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade in 1955. He also must remove (which would be even easier) the main hawks on TV, including Maxim Shevchenko and Mikhail Leontiev, who sow the hatred of the external world on an everyday basis by inventing the most absurd theories about the subversive activities of the United States and the Ukraine against Russia.

Whether and when Medvedev will choose this scenario is highly uncertain. Many subjective and objective factors are in the game. So far, all signals coming from Moscow indicate that Medvedev, as Putin promised, will stick to the imperial ideology. He had no objection against the military parade on the Red Square on May 9, which was clearly addressed not to foreign governments in order to scare them, but only to the domestic audience in order to fuel the imperial spirit in the country. In his speech at the parade, Medvedev talked about some enemies who present threats to the motherland. In his capacity as president, Medvedev deemed it necessary to visit the base of strategic missiles in order to “enjoy,” as reported by a Moscow newspapers, “the might of Russian weapons.”

The new president also hailed Russian TV, an open bulwark of the imperial ideology, and the antidemocratic policy as “one of the best in the world.” Instead of Tbilisi and Kiev, Medvedev chose as the place of his first visits Astana (the capital of Kazakhstan) and Beijing (the capital of China). Both visits, as Moscow newspapers wrote, demonstrated the continuity of Putin’s foreign policy. However, these first steps did not doom the idea of a future perestroika. Mikhail Gorbachev, in the first year of his tenure, verbally attacked imperialism and considered the improvement of the Soviet military forces as his main task.

However, it is almost certain that a return to democracy in Russia lies in the capitals of Ukraine and Georgia. Friendly relations with its neighboring countries are important to Russia because any hatred of them damages the Russian people. Whoever becomes the next American president, he or she should pay special attention to the relations between Russia and its neighbors. Without an improvement of these relationships, Russia will not be a stable partner in solving the world’s major problems.

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Russian popular opinion on the "frozen conflicts"

[image source]

The Russian Analytical Digest (RAD) is a valuable resource; each issue focuses on a different topic (almost always something highly relevant to current events) and has essays as well as polling data. A recent issue focused on the "frozen conflicts" (even as that term comes to seem less and less apt) in Georgia. The lead essay provided a good overview of the ongoing tension between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and incorporated some of the ideas that were discussed at a recent conference on the "frozen conflicts" that I was fortunate enough to attend.

One interesting thing that the RAD often does is put together relevant polls on whatever topic the issue is covering, often using Russia's major polling outfits. Even though one of them has been compromised after its director received an award from Putin for his work during the recent election campaign, their polls are still probably the best ways to follow the changes in Russian public opinion over a span of years. Here are a few of RAD's graphical summaries of their polling data on Abkhazia and South Ossetia (click on them to enlarge if you can't read the fine print):

[original source - Levada Center]

[original source - VTsIOM]

Russia's third major polling agency, FOM, also had a report in early April about the situation surrounding Abkhazia, with some interesting analysis about the changes in Russian public opinion about the secessionist region over the years:

And how have the events in Kosovo affected Russians' attitudes toward the Abkhazian problem? Reference to the example of Kosovo is encountered fairly rarely among the arguments advanced by those in favor of recognizing Abkhazia's independence - in just 2% of the responses: "how is it any worse than Kosovo?"; "America recognized Kosovo, and we need to recognize Abkhazia"; "in connection with Kosovo - likewise." [these are quotations from FOM's respondents]

There is, however, another number, which obviously demonstrates that the events in Kosovo have put Russians noticeably on guard. Since October 2006, the portion of our fellow citizens who believe that Russia should recognize Abkhazia's independence has declined by 12% - from 51% to 39%. Correspondingly, the percentage of respondents who found this question difficult to answer increased from 30 to 45%. The answers to the free-form questions prevent us from concluding that support in Russia for Georgian sovereignty over the region has increased. More likely, we should conclude that solidarity with Serbia and feelings of sympathy for the "brother Slavs" related to their loss of Kosovo forced some Russians to begin to doubt whether it is desirable or acceptable to promote separatist tendencies wherever they may arise - including in Georgia.

The FOM question discussed in the bit I translated above was worded as follows (the graphic is from the same report):

In 1999, Abkhazia declared its statehood and independence [from Georgia]. Other countries have not recognized Abkhazia's independence. Do you think that Russia should or should not recognize Abkhazia's independence?

(left column - should [recognize]; center - should not [recognize]; right column - difficult to say)

(blue - July 29-30, 2006; purple - Oct. 7-8, 2006; yellow - March 29-30, 2008)

The latest chapter (or perhaps the latest paragraph in the latest chapter) in this very long story would seem to be this report.

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"Contempt and Compassion"

Respected (and at one time, arrested) journalist Valerii Panyushkin published an article in Vedomosti two Fridays ago which became quite controversial in the Russian blogosphere. Panyushkin decided to use some of his free time during the May holidays to read some blogs on LiveJournal and write about what he saw. He made it clear that he wasn't focusing on, "how shall I put it, the 'leaders' of Internet public opinion, all those 'tysiachniki'[1], the pro-Kremlin or anti-Kremlin Internet screamers," which according to him was because such bloggers are professionals whose writings have nothing to do with their actual opinions ("if a person is a janitor, that doesn't necessarily mean he is a neatnik").

Instead, he focused on the blogs of people who leave comments on some of the more popular LiveJournals. His article, titled "Contempt and Compassion," was hardly a flattering look into the RuBlogosphere. The first sentence read, "People, I've read your diaries. You are non-entities." I'm pretty sure there have been similar snarky commentaries about bloggers in the American mainstream media, but I'll leave it up to you to find them.

As for Panyushkin's article, I decided to translate just one paragraph:

My little male bloggers from time to time also write in their blogs about patriotism. Their patriotic outpourings usually have something about the demeaned and insulted Motherland. But other than the Limonovtsy, I didn't see a single patriotic blogger who had sacrificed anything of substance for their demeaned and insulted Motherland.

Bloggers' reactions to Panyushkin's article at one point occupied 15 of the 30 top spots on Yandex's "popular posts" list. Presumably those reactions were mostly negative - if you're interested, you can follow some of the links below.

[1] тысячник - a "thousandeer," a LiveJournal blogger with 1,000 or more "friends."

Презрение и сострадание Валерий Панюшкин об интернет-дневниках У пользователя «ЖЖ» годами может не быть ни одного всплеска отчаяния, только вялое нытье Далее Эта статья в блогах [?] tema, radulova, tanyant, evil-ninja, dolboeb, m-yu-sokolov, doctor-liza, olegart, sermal, skuzn, prof-rabotnik, barabanch, oleg-kozyrev, ivand, _kutuzov, golishev, kovanova, turova, rostovsad, guruken, penguinny, antusha, anashulick, ms-lizzy-bennet, zurfreude, pe3yc, kamrad-kats, maxim-kononenko, neznaika-nalune, kozenko, scottishkot, lvoropaeva, 1755078, dobrokhotov, ladoga, cybervantuz, namarsh_ru, shurics, obezyana, kolezev, youzef, krasovkin, _kogan_, pigbig, ru_politics, epliss, sexfunk, fomenko, shurko, winnukem, roman-shurukhin, kookoondra, e228, bekara, mosmellowman, robyana, allan999, blue-olusha, t-link, yuozik, ulixes, doronin, d-eva-chka, rigello, 1447, davelee76, peresedov, thecheshirecat, aisatu, in-b, evi-19, berlinka, trigg, worvik, sling, der-wish, nataljusha, rajaka, rimona, uncle-thompson, _ko_alla, stuart1861, chiifa, nedolboeb, dmih, feeling-of-void, anykeen, richard-grm, dorothy91, stas-kulesh, guralyuk, hate-daily, the-jove, shirly-noclaf, missseeya, dobrotolubie, cesurka, paufnuty, yangel, hollandrat, sinnieonfire, kliuv, hiddenmit, 1684702, alderina, diksi, partr, kozhev, kaizer-84, theeinstein, q-marik, chemodanov, cka304huk, captain-memo, zubkoff, maliar, kinshik, tapirr, melnikoff, lunaire, glint-way, lilit-boo, talismanser, ermouth, tr00per, h-op-e, anutka-il, anglus, catpad, todofmm, moon-live, gella4ka, psychomodo, kototuj, lyamur, zzerzonat, freken-boo, contra-ventum, 944340, izbuh, yandex-top-ru, topbot_flashr, _elhana_, roman-n, tanast, soboleva-t, alex-celly, prime12, rozanof, lunar-mist, olamia, goodwin45, surjojo, kilya-ya, bezumnypiero, satanya-chan, snadworm-arr, _kv, superina, nikitina-mama, chmv_, spirit-of, ultroliberal, elena-hochnadel, nu-i-shto, freya1, _starley_, dzz, pani-janna, mortang, alexey-viper, myem, vs-beloff, mark1992, al-manama, oxxx, trauch, witard, as-ne4aev, sergius, fedor-shilov, interviwer, zlaya-koroleva, vitaliy-fadeyev, viking-nord, djdrive, die-tier, asya-kareva, mamacholy, marish-plohish, yandex-top5, v-l-a-d-i, zakharov-m, wegg, ksyuhin-i-ya, el-periodista, inosmi_ru, arcaim, perlovka-blog, 45878, yandex-top10, kinomonster, soamo, kotarko, gmz, zen-buddha, demset, gatazo, alextr98, svinka-majalis, mind-exploded, jarolep, hitin, bp21, marina74, otshelnica, roma-2, aledr, g-r-p, moorca, kerlangua, odozmorov, brain_marrow, alexandra-junne, bigshaft, kottega, vialla, tinskaya, dn-d, lazy_rabbit, nadeyka-sh, leonsija, ervix, violent_vertigo, ajde-jano, readership, silberwe, tribunus, innomini, lisusha, rodoss, reistlin, male-x, sjevn, dobroslav, kumaxx, smolyak, hermangen, sceptic-rus, domkin, 986667, ivan-laptev, mikrukova, mont-blanc, mcarrow83, niotkyda, da-het, la-asteria, fagot99, nicodim-from, anhela-l, lovely-witch, adora-m, beobaxter, tommy-art, alliruk, mikhail-golub, hermionita, erenko, onsamyi, valnaya, emia99, doobydoom, dolgova, kfadffal, nexxon, catbayan, faiman, webalkach, mangusta, bagbier, ljoshkina, khorkoff, 2308342, cold-n-sour, neumno, zverozyab, ailoyros, tverdyi-znak, 2289491, vewwww, andrey-fromfili, lafdanov, mechanician, rachelka, idillliya, docent-07, duhonavt, hozhai, lafdanov, visvit, belko-i-pr, ollia-lukoye, ray-binko, semtn, m-oduvanka, 5fjord, thecrazyelf, lera-posmitnaya, psy-afterdark, marzipanela, dad_s, rotwain, dsa-blogspot, rein-bl8d, vinokurov, caesar-magnus, dazor

via barabanch

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