Cause and effect, a.k.a. "диктатура закона"

Cause:

"Mechel was selling steel in Russia at twice the price it put on exports," Putin said in televised comments. "And where has the margin for the state taxes gone?"

Mechel's owner, billionaire Igor Zyuzin, was reportedly ill and not present at the meeting to hear Putin's threat.

"The director has been invited, and he suddenly became ill,'' Putin said. "Of course, illness is illness, but I think he should get well as soon as possible. Otherwise, we will have to send him a doctor and clean up all the problems." [...]

"I'm asking the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service to pay special attention to the problem -- and maybe even the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor General's Office."

Watch the video. As one of the commenters at drugoi's post on this topic noted, it's not just the words, it's the intonation - and, I would add, the gestures. And the swift official follow-up. No doubt "А маржа где?" will soon become a catchphrase in Moscow OCG and high finance circles alike.


Effect:

[source]

More narrative on the fallout here, here and here. No doubt someone made a bundle. Talk about bread and circuses.

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Platon's plaudit for Putin portrait

[image source]

The head shot of Vladimir Putin looking ice-cold that graced the cover of Time's "Man of the Year" issue last year - not to mention the photo inside that had Putin looking like a cross between a tsar' and a godfather - caused quite a stir (earlier SoM posts about the issue are here and here) and had many people wondering how the photographer was able to get such shots of the Russian president. Now that photog, who goes by the name Platon, has won a World Press Photo award for the picture. As it turns out, there is indeed a fairly interesting story surrounding the photo.

You can listen to an interview with Platon in which he tells the tale of how he got the shot on the World Press Photo award website (click on 2008 and then the thumbnail of VVP) - the tale has been noted by at least a couple of photography-focused blogs as worth a listen, and I second that impression. I haven't seen a transcript anywhere, or I'd paste in some of the more interesting bits, but again, the whole thing is worth listening to.

Sofia Kornienko of Radio Svoboda interviewed Platon (as well as Stanley Green, who is famous as a photo-chronicler of Chechnya) and also got some fairly interesting comments about the Putin photo. Her own comments about the impact of the Putin "Man of the Year" issue are also quite interesting, although some of her conclusions strike me as perhaps a bit exaggerated. I decided to translate a portion of the interview (n.b. presumably an original English-language text of this interview exists somewhere, but I couldn't find it online; there are likely to be substantial differences between the original and my somewhat stilted re-translation back into English - as always here at Scraps of Moscow, you get what you pay for):

Platon: [the first part of the interview tracks closely with the story told by Platon in the audio interview linked above - Kornienko identifies Platon as a "fan of tall tales"] Then Putin came into the room, and I think he felt sorry for me. I was all sweaty and about to lose it. Pity is the only reason he agreed to pose for me. The ability to make people feel sorry for you is the photographer's greatest weapon.

The first thing I said to him was, "Let's not stand on ceremony. What was it like to meet Paul McCartney?" Everyone in the room was shocked, because in Putin's office you're supposed to stay very serious, and no one smiles. Then, when we had finished the photo shoot and were talking about the Beatles, I thought I was able to get inside his interior world.

The picture I took was a play on the Godfather, or Scarface, or something like that. I think Putin liked that picture. After all, it's what he wants, it's his style to look like a gangster.

Sofia Kornienko: After the awards ceremony, I asked Platon why he decided to take on this assignment.

Platon: It's my job. I have very strong political views, but my job is to take people's pictures, therefore part of my work is to break down the natural barrier, the natural resistance [of the subject] upon meeting them, whether it is simple shyness, emotion or a lack of confidence, to break down that barrier and reach the internal content of their personality.

In this case, I had just eight minutes to feel out that connection with what the person had inside. Having felt out the person's internal substance, I have to capture it as I see it. As far as political views, it's not my role to come up with an angle or approach to the subject ahead of time that would intentionally depict him as an evil man, if I perhaps think that's what he is. My agreement to photograph someone [also] doesn't mean that I have agreed to idolize him or sing his praises. I simply documented his presence for history.

Sofia Kornienko: But the issue of Time which named Putin "Man of the Year," on the cover of which your photograph appeared, as well as the interview illustrated by your portrait, was perceived by many liberally oriented people in Russia and outside of Russia as a betrayal on the part of our Western colleagues whose support is so highly valued. Putin's interview with Time didn't contain a single question which could have provoked a substantive discussion and, in the eyes of many, discredited the Western ideals of the free press which have generally been considered the benchmark [for journalists everywhere].

Doesn't it seem that your photograph was used as a banner or symbol of this tendency which disappointed so many readers, and what would you like to say to people who found that issue of the magazine outrageous or insulting?

Platon: The fact of the matter is that, as I already said, it's my job to document people living today. If I had lived in the 1940s, it's quite possible that I would have photographed Stalin. That doesn't mean that I support the subjects of my photos. The main thing is to get a portrait that shows who my subject really is. I can't control what happens with the portrait after that.

As soon as a photo is published, it leaves my sphere of influence and becomes public property. I am sure that one way or another history brings the truth to the surface. It's possible that some people were outraged by that issue of Time or by the context in which [Putin] was presented - I can't change that. But I documented him. I showed that if you look deep into his eyes, you see power, strength, incredible self-discipline and cold, icy cold.

I have my own strength: a visual image is able to convey to the audience that which the written word cannot. Perhaps people felt that their ideals were betrayed by the written words, but as far as the photograph, it shows Putin as he really is. That's the way he is. And one can't not accept a precise portrait, because it is true to life and honest. I tried to be honest with myself and with Putin when I was working. That's all you can expect from a photographer.

Radio Svoboda interview via barabanch

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Echoes of Victory Day and the Inauguration

I happened to catch a re-run of the Daily Show a week or two ago and saw Jon Stewart's hilarious and surprisingly on-point riff on the Victory Day parade and Medvedev's inauguration ceremony. Transcribing selected sound bites from the clip wouldn't do it justice - just watch it and laugh:

That - as well as the return of the outstanding Darkness at Noon, which is back on line and has posted an original video of the V-Day festivities in Moscow, inspired me to corral a few links to online material on the events in Moscow of four weeks or so ago.

CSIS's Sarah Mendelson wrote a "critical questions" brief about the significance of the re-militarization of the Victory Day celebrations, which included a brief digression down memory lane, as Mendelson recalled attending a Soviet military parade in late 1990.

Global Voices Online had roundups about both the inauguration and Victory Day. And the always interesting Wu Wei has an interesting account of what it was like to watch Medvedev's inauguration on Georgian TV.

[Update June 15: I wanted to direct readers as well to this link which fell through the cracks - Oleg Panfilov's brief comments stating that the question of who has the upper hand as between Putin and Medvedev will become clear when one of the two begins to enjoy an advantage in TV coverage.]

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Pondering the prospects for a post-Putin "perestroika"

[image source]

I found this article fascinating - hopeful and yet pessimistic at the same time, it perhaps relies too much on comparisons with the USSR and makes a conclusion that may be too bold. But its author, an emigre sociologist and a long-time and prolific commentator on life and public opinion in the USSR and Russia, makes a number of important points in arriving at that conclusion.

Johnson's Russia List
27 May 2008
How the new Russian President could start a new Perestroika with friendly trips to the capitals of neighboring countries
By Vladimir Shlapentokh
Michigan State University

[...]

[M]aintaining the image of the world as an enemy of Russia is a crucial way to legitimize current regime, along with the political stability in the country. The imperial ideology exploits the nostalgia of many Russians for the great empire and abets nationalism. It pits the population against foreign countries, treating them as hostile toward Russia and its integrity, and as working against the restoration of the country’s previous geopolitical role. In order to maintain a climate of patriotic agitation and divert the people from the country’s real problems, Russian politicians and journalists talk incessantly about “great Russia,” “Russia’s great past,” and “the great victory in 1945.” It is remarkable that, on the official site of the Russian president (2000-2007), the adjective “great” was mentioned more than 3000 times.

The practicality of the imperial ideology is seen in the fact that up to 85 percent of the population, according to a survey by the BBC at the beginning of 2008, responded positively, in one way or another, to the xenophobic propaganda of the Kremlin and its foreign policy. In fact, the ruling elite do not possess other ideological ways to influence the minds of most Russians. Alternative ideological fundamentals, such as private property and the market economy (in April 2008, Medvedev underscored their importance for Russia), are not attractive at all to the majority of the population, which hates the corrupt bureaucrats and their illegal fortunes. Only 10 percent of the population, according to a survey by Levada’s polling firm conducted in November 2007, declared that they “respect people who became rich in the last 10-15 years.”

Only the imperial ideology allowed the Kremlin to pursue its deeply antidemocratic domestic policy and disregard the growing social inequality in the country. This ideology justifies the supremacy of the “national leader” and the mistreatment of democratic institutions. It presents the members of the opposition as almost foreign agents and makes it impossible for Western organizations, such as the British Council, to function in Russia. It justifies the rude intervention of the state in the activities of foreign companies, such as British Petroleum, which cannot protect their interests against Russian competitors. It helps persecute the Protestant Church in Russia as an American agent. The imperial ideology also treats Stalin as its main hero and maintains his positive image by silencing the media’s coverage of the mass terror in Soviet times.

In fact, the imperial ideology is only meant for a domestic audience and its influence on the relations with foreign countries is rather limited. The case involving the USA is typical. During the parliamentary (December 2007) and presidential (March 2008) elections, the volume of anti-American propaganda was extremely high. However, this propaganda did relatively little to deteriorate the relations between the two countries and in no way prevented the cordial meeting between Bush and Putin in Sochi where they, like a loving couple, went to see the sunset on the Black Sea on March 27.

In order to restart Russia’s move toward democracy, it is vitally important to break the spine of the imperial ideology. Germany and Japan, after the war, would not have been able to take the road toward democracy without a resolute and consistent rejection of the ideology of supremacy, militarism and expansionism.

The most peculiar fact is that a radical change of foreign policy is much easier than doing the same in domestic affairs. This is exactly what should be on Medvedev’s mind, if he wishes to be a liberal and not one of Putin’s clones. Medvedev seemingly understands the danger of using “greatness” as the central postulate of the official ideology. In April 2008, Nikolai Svanidze, a known Russian journalist, asked Medvedev, “What does great Russia mean to you?” Putin’s heir answered, “Russia, without doubt, is a great country.” However, he then called upon the Russians “not to be intoxicated” with the idea of “greatness” and to look soberly at the real position of Russia in the world.

Many liberals are waiting for the release from prison of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an oligarch jailed by Putin for his political ambitions. However, Medvedev would have a more difficult time releasing Khodorkovsky than attacking the imperial ideology. As a matter of fact, liberalizations in post-Stalin Russia began in this area. Even before Khrushchev’s famous speech about Stalin’s atrocities at the Twentieth Party Congress, he proclaimed a policy of peaceful coexistence and undertook a number of actions that radically changed Soviet foreign policy. He was instrumental in the achievement of the armistice in Korea in 1953 and the peace in Indochina in 1954. Then, in 1955, he made a trip to Yugoslavia and apologized for Stalin’s policy toward this country and its leader Josip Tito. Then (still in 1955 and before “the thaw”) he reduced the Soviet army.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign deeds also preceded his domestic liberal policy. Before the Soviet people and the world understood Gorbachev’s democratic intentions, which did not become clear until 1987, the new Soviet leader met with Reagan in November 1985, only a few months after his ascension to power. This meeting marked the beginning of the warming of relations between the two superpowers. It was followed by a new meeting with the American president in the next year in Reykjavik. By 1987, the USSR and USA prepared a treaty on the elimination of short- and middle-range missiles.

The experiences of Khrushchev and Gorbachev might serve as a playbook for the new president, if he had the guts to turn toward the democratic road. In fact, the major obstacle to democratization is the Kremlin’s support for the imperial and nationalist ideology.

Ironically, the key element of the imperial ideology and Russian foreign policy that should be attacked by a new reformer is not the animosity against the West, the USA or Europe. The hatred of Russia’s neighboring countries (the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia, and former satellites such as Poland) plays a much more important role today. For instance, in April­May 2008, Russian media talked much more about the perfidious Georgia than England, which now, after the Litvinenko case, is also treated as a committed enemy of Russia. What is more, the media talked about Georgia almost as much as it did about NATO, which is seen as another one of the country’s fierce enemies. Indeed, between April 21 and May 22 , Georgia was mentioned almost 590 in 50 major Russian newspapers; England was mentioned 420 times and NATO 425 . The Kremlin’s aggressiveness toward the neighboring countries is a major source of friction between it and the West, which became apparent at the Bucharest meeting of NATO in April 2008.

Many experts in Russia and the West believe that the imperial ideology is deeply rooted in the Russian mind. Of course, the traditions of the country’s political culture, with its authoritarianism and xenophobia, are quite strong. However, the impact of the media on the Russians is much stronger. Khrushchev easily and almost instantly transformed public attitudes toward Tito’s Yugoslavia, a “fascist country,” from deep hostility to friendliness. President Reagan was vilified by the Soviet media in all possible ways from the moment of his inauguration in January 1981. However, when he came to Moscow as Gorbachev’s guest in May 1988 (I was there and watched it myself), he was greeted by ordinary people and intellectuals with great joy.

It would be easier for the Kremlin to redirect the media away from its hostility toward the Ukraine and Georgia than make the judicial system honest and independent. If president Medvedev decided to “reboot” the Russian political process, he would have to go on friendly visits to the capitals of all neighboring countries, starting with Kiev and Tbilisi. These visits would be as historically important as Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade in 1955. He also must remove (which would be even easier) the main hawks on TV, including Maxim Shevchenko and Mikhail Leontiev, who sow the hatred of the external world on an everyday basis by inventing the most absurd theories about the subversive activities of the United States and the Ukraine against Russia.

Whether and when Medvedev will choose this scenario is highly uncertain. Many subjective and objective factors are in the game. So far, all signals coming from Moscow indicate that Medvedev, as Putin promised, will stick to the imperial ideology. He had no objection against the military parade on the Red Square on May 9, which was clearly addressed not to foreign governments in order to scare them, but only to the domestic audience in order to fuel the imperial spirit in the country. In his speech at the parade, Medvedev talked about some enemies who present threats to the motherland. In his capacity as president, Medvedev deemed it necessary to visit the base of strategic missiles in order to “enjoy,” as reported by a Moscow newspapers, “the might of Russian weapons.”

The new president also hailed Russian TV, an open bulwark of the imperial ideology, and the antidemocratic policy as “one of the best in the world.” Instead of Tbilisi and Kiev, Medvedev chose as the place of his first visits Astana (the capital of Kazakhstan) and Beijing (the capital of China). Both visits, as Moscow newspapers wrote, demonstrated the continuity of Putin’s foreign policy. However, these first steps did not doom the idea of a future perestroika. Mikhail Gorbachev, in the first year of his tenure, verbally attacked imperialism and considered the improvement of the Soviet military forces as his main task.

However, it is almost certain that a return to democracy in Russia lies in the capitals of Ukraine and Georgia. Friendly relations with its neighboring countries are important to Russia because any hatred of them damages the Russian people. Whoever becomes the next American president, he or she should pay special attention to the relations between Russia and its neighbors. Without an improvement of these relationships, Russia will not be a stable partner in solving the world’s major problems.

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"Putin on the Ritz"

This is rather hilarious (the summary for this clip at the "Mini Movie" website reads, "Two lame duck leaders and one classic song can only add up to one thing: DANCING!"):

Via drugoi.

[update May 29 - I changed the embedded video to the version uploaded on YouTube, since the Mini Movie embed for some reason cannot be made not to play every time the front page of the blog is loaded. If anyone knows how to fix this for my future reference, please let me know.

Also, a couple of articles from years past which used "Putin on the Ritz" as their headline:

- Michael McFaul's review of Peter Baker and Susan Glasser's book, Kremlin Rising;
- an article by Nikolas Gvosdev about the 2006 G-8 summit in St. Petersburg.]

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Stability

President Vladimir Putin and First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, March 7, 2006.
[image source]

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev, May 12, 2008.
[image source - some of the comments there are laugh-out-loud funny]

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"Neutral peacekeepers"

One of my favorite topics has been very much in the news of late, and I wish I had more time to blog about it. I'm referring to Abkhazia, of course, the dispute over which even RIA Novosti now acknowledges, is a "Russian-Georgian dispute."*

This is something that a number of people have been saying for some time; perhaps the most forceful writings to that effect (and some of the most thorough English-language reporting on the "frozen conflicts" in general) can be found here. You can read a very articulate and current account from the Georgian point of view at cyxymu's blog (Civil Georgia is probably the best online source in English); the best place for the official Russian point of view is probably the RIA Novosti topical page (and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiques available in English here and here). But my original point was that I don't, unfortunately, have time at the moment to write a lengthy post on this matter. Luckily, RIA Novosti's outstanding photo archive has a picture that is worth a thousand words:

Official caption: Dmitry Rogozin, leader of the Rodina faction in the State Duma, during his working trip to Abkhazia, where he visited a CIS United Forces' headquarter [sic]. June 14, 2004.

Look over Rogozin's right shoulder - whose stern visage is that? The Гарант's, of course. It is interesting that a firebrand like Rogozin would be invited to visit the HQ of a "neutral peacekeeping operation" (though of course such an event is not news to anyone; Zhirik and others have paid visits to Abkhazia as well and no doubt also been well received by the "CIS" Peacekeeping Force), and even more interesting that such a supposedly multilateral "peacekeeping operation" would have a portrait of President Putin hanging on the wall.

*Certainly there remains a Georgian-Abkhazian element to the conflict, but if we imagine a "what-if" version of history where Russia played a genuinely neutral role in the settlement efforts over the past ten-plus years, it's difficult to imagine that some sort of resolution wouldn't have been reached.

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День Победы...Путина?

Does the way this photo was shot remind you of anything? [image source]

An interesting thing about this era of "tandemocracy" that seems at least for the moment to be upon us - even more than usual, everything can be seen (at least) in two ways. Putin's policy-laden speech to the Duma could be (a) a way for him to show that, in contrast to Medvedev, whose inaugural speech seemed relatively empty (notwithstanding the banalities about human rights and freedoms and the law; mentioning these things is not necessarily indicative of a change or "thaw," after all the idea of "free people in a free society" was prominent in Putin's 2004 inaugural speech and "dictatorship of the law" was a theme dating back to early in Putin's first term), Putin will continue to be the policymaker-in-chief; or (b) a soon-to-be Prime Minister making a speech about domestic policy fully appropriate for someone in his position.

The proposal of an oil tax reduction could be (a) Putin's way of showing the oiligarchs that he is the one who can continue to provide them with goodies (and, again, a way of underscoring who calls the shots on the issues the elites are really concerned about - hint: those issues are not "freedom" and "law") or (b) a thoughtful way to help President Medvedev's first term get started off on a note of optimism. Putin's uncontrolled laughter at Zhirik's silliness in the Duma on May 8 (truly, the court jester amusing the sovereign(s)) could be either (a) the relieved laughter of a man who has had the weight of governing Russia lifted from his shoulders, or (b) the nefarious chortling of a man who finds himself amused by the high position occupied by such a clown within the system he has set up and intends to continue to control.

Allowing Zyuganov's critical speech to the Duma to appear on Channel 1 could be (a) a good way to demonstrate the existence of an opposition while not giving media time to anyone who could actually be a viable independent contender for the presidency in the future or (b) an actual indication of some sort of "thaw" with respect to criticism of the government appearing on the major TV channels. I could go on, but I've probably already lost even my 10 regular readers by this point.

Only time will tell if Medvedev turns out to be his own man as President or simply a "Prezik" to be used by Putin like a condom ("prezik" in Russian slang) to stay safely inside the Russian body politic and later disposed of. Please forgive the metaphor - I'm hardly the first to think of it, and doesn't it work, at least to a point?

[image source]

It's possible that May 8, 2008, will come to be seen as the day Putin began to fade from the scene; at the moment, though, it seems more likely that we'll look back on it as the day VVP changed chairs but kept pulling most of the same strings. The focus of the endless Kremlinoputinology will now turn to the relationship between Vova and Dima and will no doubt include much speculation about when VVP might start thinking about returning to the Kremlin.

One bit of speculation so far has been that the calendar of elections might be changed so that the parliamentary and presidential elections don't fall in the same year, which could entail a new presidential election in 2010, by which time the Constitution could already have been amended to allow for 7-year presidential terms. Putin could serve two of those and be ready for a hard-earned retirement. It's all idle speculation at this point, though.

In any event, from outside Russia, there seems to be hope for a change, hope that the dyarchy will eventually reveal rifts within the ruling elite and the result will be some sort of pluralism - or at least a lurch in the direction of a more cooperative posture towards the West, one that recognizes that interests can coincide and that "defending Russia's national interests" does not always have to mean playing the spoiler to America or resisting what Western countries want. From inside Russia, this prediction seems as good as any other I've seen:

In the circus they only keep the little bears until they're three years old, after that they mature and are unmanageable and extremely aggressive.

There's no doubt that "Operation Successor" has up to now been as successful as its authors could have hoped. If one takes the maximally cynical view of Putin, one must assume he'll be watching Dima like a hawk to make sure the latter doesn't "pull a Putin" and develop a mind of his own. If one believes that Putin is contemplating fading from the scene in a couple of years, well, his first appearance as PM doesn't really suggest a man who's thinking about hanging it up, but perhaps there will be a trend in that direction.

In any event, the country will have a chance to contemplate all of these things today while celebrating the victory over Germany 63 years ago. All seems set for Victory Day. By happy coincidence (actually, the date of Medvedev's inauguration is consistent with the past two inaugurations, so the timing wasn't specially arranged for this year), Putin's confirmation as PM came just in time for the country to celebrate with a long weekend.

It's a well-known fact that Moscow doesn't believe in tears. Apparently,
though, Moscow does believe in gigantic, man-made phallic symbols.
[image source]

So, after convincing the nation to "slit'sia v ekstaze" and vote overwhelmingly for Medvedev, Russians will have the chance to "spit'sia v ekstaze" while enjoying what will no doubt be wall-to-wall TV coverage of the military parade in Moscow. One has to ask whose victory is really being celebrated, especially given the somewhat controversial decision to return this year to the Soviet practice of displaying missiles and other hardware in the Victory Day parade.

Photo from Nashi's 2007 summer camp at Lake Seliger.
The banner says, "There will be sovereign democracy!"
[image source]

Adding to the impression that Putin & Co. are celebrating their victories in the 2007-08 elections is the fact that, just like after a military victory, various heroic veterans have recently been rewarded for their service to the fatherland (or, as Gazeta headlined its story on this, "For Servicing the Fatherland"):

KREMLIN AWARDS POLITICAL SUPPORTERS (RFE/RL, April 28, 2008)
President Putin has signed a decree awarding state orders to a number of Kremlin-friendly analysts, political commentators, and media figures, "Kommersant" reported on April 26. According to the decree, which was reportedly signed earlier this month, the order For Service to the Fatherland, first degree, was given to IMA public-relations group head Andrei Gnatyuk.

The same award, second degree, was given to All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion Director Valery Fyodorov, former Nashi leader and current State Youth Affairs Committee Chairman Vasily Yakemenko, and Effective Politics Foundation head Gleb Pavlovsky. The same decree bestows honorary certificates on Channel One head Konstantin Ernst, All-Russia State Television and Radio Company (VGTRK) head Oleg Dobrodeyev, NTV head Vladimir Kulistikov, Center for Political Forecasting Deputy Director Vitaly Ivanov, and a number of activists in the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi. According to "Kommersant," the awards are directly tied to the contributions the recipients made to the victory of Unified Russia in the December 2007 Duma elections and Medvedev's victory in the March presidential election. Gazeta.ru reported on April 25 that Gnatyuk's IMA group oversaw the implementation of both election campaigns.

This should reinforce the conventional wisdom that VTsIOM polls on Russian domestic politics should be taken with a grain of salt. With respect to the executives from state-run TV channels, it simply underscores the obvious: they are the President's colleagues, his valued partners in the important task of keeping the masses properly mis- and underinformed; and they have been given a little pat on the head for smoothly managing the media environment during the recently concluded electoral cycle. Never mind that what Putin likely perceives as the main "victory" - the avoidance of a "colored revolution" - was, given his government's substantial genuine popularity, probably such a remote possibility as to really only exist as "cockroaches in his head," to use the Russian expression about personal hang-ups.

Anyway, the Kommersant article cited by RFE/RL digs deeper and describes the Putin Administration's recent tradition of taking care of the friendly journalists at state-run TV channels by bestowing government awards upon them (my translation):

In November of 2006, for the first time in the history of television President Putin gave a large group of TV employees (more than 100 people) awards phrased "For making a large contribution to the development of Russian teleradiobroadcasting and for long-time fruitful work." The formal reason for the awards was the 75th anniversary of broadcasting in the country. Among those receiving awards were predominantly employees of the three federal TV channels - Channel One, Rossiia, and NTV.

"For Services to the Fatherland" orders of the fourth degree were awarded to six people, including Mr. Ernst and Mr. Dobrodeyev. Mr. Kulistikov also received an Order of Honor. Half a year later in June of 2007, almost as many employees of the federal TV channels, mostly from Rossiia, NTV and TV Center (TVTs) received orders and medals of various ranks with the same phrase as the one used the year before for their colleagues.

The tradition actually seems to go back at least three years now - back in March 2005, I posted about Sergei Ivanov giving awards to then-ORT reporter Margarita Simonyan and her colleague from RTR. Simonyan's real reward, of course, turned out to be her chance to head up the Russia Today project. After all, nothing says "thank you" - in any language! - like the chance to manage the cash flowing into a government project. Kommersant also notes that Yeltsin officially thanked several hundred people after the 1996 elections, including members of the media, but there was no "For Service to the Fatherland" award at that time (it was introduced in 1999).

Regrettably, I haven't had much time in recent weeks to browse around and see what the Russian blogosphere is saying about all of this. Ilya Barabanov had a simple "no comment" about the awards story.

My photo, taken in late Dec. 2005 in Moscow.
An explanation of the meaning for non-Russian-speakers is here.
The photo is part of a large set of my photos of Moscow stickers,
graffiti and other "street art" which can be viewed here.

Notwithstanding the criticism which must be present in the RuBlogosphere (though as I mentioned, I haven't had time to survey it recently as much as usual), I doubt too many Russians really feel as negatively about Putin's latest victory as the folks who made the sticker shown above; certainly opinion polls suggest the percentage of people who view the current state of affairs negatively is quite low indeed. For the time being, that's true even of polls conducted by pollsters who haven't received awards for services rendered to the fatherland.

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Eight Years of "Putinisms" - from NPR

[Image source]

NPR had an interesting segment this morning covering some of Putin's more pithy statements from over the years. "Putinisms" of course don't necessarily have anything to do with "Putinism" (however one defines the term); in the American context, the idea is an adaptation of Slate Magazine's long-running "Bushisms" feature (which has turned into something of a franchise for its progenitor, Jacob Weisberg).

Perhaps to Putin's credit, his "isms" seem to all be badass, tough-guy statements (even if they are often in poor taste and may sometimes just be good character acting), while Bush's "isms" are mostly verbal flubs or statements suggesting outright idiocy. Collections of Putin aphorisms in Russian are available here and here, and you can read some of the better nuggets of his "First Person" book here.

I wonder if any of the "Putinisms" quoted by NPR made it onto the paper airplanes and balloons (inscribed with quotations from Putin and Medvedev) released by youth activists in Chelyabinsk last month. Probably not, as the selection of quotes used in that so-called "flash-mob" was apparently limited to the topic of education.

Last year, Kommersant published a guide to management based wisdom collected from various remarks by Putin. You can improve your managerial skills online here - they even give you the chance to test yourself to see whether the manual has helped you learn to respond to a Putin-style manager.

In any event, "Putinisms" are fun, but I'm sure Putin's supporters would say that the remarks collected by NPR do not accurately characterize their beloved president. On the other hand, if you string enough Putinisms together, I think it may be possible to get a fairly good sense of Putinism's essence. Here is a link to the NPR report (which includes sound bites), and here is their bonus list of "Putinisms" not mentioned in the report.

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Why Putin is like Mugabe*

Zimbabwe's President Mugabe has been accusing his political opponents of intending to return farms to their dispossessed white owners.** Where have I seen similar populist rhetoric recently? Oh, right:

[image source]

The Nashi pamphlet this page comes from is an old story, but it is a good illustration of the Kremlin's main anti-Kasyanov talking point throughout the 07-08 election cycle - that he would surrender Russia's oil wealth to "the West" and take things back to the bad old days of the 1990s.

Here is a translation of the quotation attributed to Mikhail Kasyanov (under the banner headline, "This is what betrayal looks like"):

Having received the approval of American businessmen to enter the Russian presidential campaign, I have decided to sell Russian oil for three times less than the current market price.

And here is the actual quotation which appears to have served as the basis for the misquote above:

In his first interview with foreign media since announcing his candidacy, Mr Kasyanov said he would use the huge surplus from high oil prices to improve pipelines. He said: "Such projects would help lower the price of oil and gas on the market." A "fair price", he said, is $20-$25 a barrel. The price is now $63. "The world needs to think about alternative sources of energy, but use what we have now."

As Russian campaign spin goes, this is actually a pretty minor distortion, and no doubt Kasyanov would have been more accommodating, for example, to Western participants in the Sakhalin projects (in fact, one could argue that such accommodation would actually be in Russia's interest, since Western investment and know-how will likely be needed to maximize development of Russia's oil & gas sector). It's worth noting, though, that when Kasyanov was PM, he appeared to at least make a show of driving a hard bargain with Western investors in Russian oil projects.

Nevertheless, it served the Kremlin's interests to portray Kasyanov not only as the corrupt "Misha 2-percent" (a nickname acquired when two percent was enough of an alleged skim to seem offensive; never mind that the only proof of Kasyanov's corruption offered up to the public was a shady dacha privatization involving a sum which the barons of Rosneft and Gazprom would not bend down to pick up off the sidewalk on Tverskaya) but also as an agent of Western corporate interests. Similar nefarious intentions to forfeit Russia's oil wealth were ascribed to Vladimir Ryzhkov (apparently solely on the basis of a meeting with Dick Cheney).

Of course, the myth-making about Russian traitors would be nothing without the creation of a parallel mythology of Western politicos salivating at the prospect of carving Russia up and feasting on the oil wealth. Exhibit A in that book of fairy-tales is the infamous false claim that Madeleine Albright once stated Russia was unworthy of Siberia's oil wealth.

Unlike Zimbabwe, Russia is not a former colony of the West and has never been in danger of losing control of its natural resources. Apparently, Putin & Co. realized that the rhetoric of xenophobia and class hatred travels well to any country.

* Presumably one could fill many blog posts with why Putin is unlike Mugabe. I know almost nothing about domestic politics in African nations, so I would be on shaky ground trying to write such posts (as indeed I may be in trying to draw the comparison which provides the lede for this post). If you feel strongly about the distinctions, feel free to sketch out such posts in the comment section. Let me begin: Putin almost undoubtedly has more genuine popularity in his country than Mugabe does in his; on the other hand, Mugabe's political opponents seem to have actually made it on the ballot, an indignity which Putin refused to suffer.

** For all I know, this may be a valid accusation. My guess, however, is that Mugabe is attempting to spin a more conciliatory stance on the part of the opposition toward the farmers into some sort of treacherous behavior which goes against the interests of the state.

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Good read

LJ blogger drugoi titled his post with this photo "V for Vendetta,"
although the content of the post was laconic - "Putin in Bucharest."

A photographer who is spare with his words, drugoi is one of my favorite Russian bloggers. And I'm not the only one. The post with this photo has 153 comments, and I'm surprised it's so few - often his posts of photos with political (or politicized) subjects collect hundreds of comments.

I really enjoyed today's Moscow Times column (re-run by Russia Profile, where it will be viewable longer) by Alexander Golts (his Ezhednevny Zhurnal columns are here). Although it's brutal, I found it to be articulately brutal, if such a thing is possible, and dead-on in many respects. And it rather strangely fails to mention Georgia or Ukraine - critics of Golts's view will say this proves his one-sidedness (they'll also point out that he spent a year at Stanford, which no doubt entitles him to a lifetime of being assumed to be a US agent), but there are arguments he could have made (NATO already borders Russia; those two countries aren't going to actually be members anytime soon; etc.), and it's too bad he didn't bother.

He does, I think, a good job of describing a scenario which takes place around the world in countries other than Russia - a US "threat" is ginned up to mobilize popular support for a leader who is actually concerned about other matters entirely:

Moscow Times
April 8, 2008
West's Criticism, Not NATO, Worries Putin
By Alexander Golts

Imagine that a person decides to pose as a 19th-century Russian nobleman. He wears a long coat, walks with a cane and lets his sideburns grow long. He would suffer no serious consequences from his behavior other than the occasional shake of the head by passers-by. But now imagine that this would-be nobleman challenges others to duels at the slightest provocation and claims that the passers-by are his former serfs. At best, people would try to avoid him. At worst, they would beat him.

Something like this happened to President Vladimir Putin at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, last week.

At a security conference in Munich last year, Putin caused a scandal by suggesting that he looked at world events through Cold War eyes. He not only demanded nuclear parity with the United States but asserted that the placement of 10 U.S. missiles in Poland threatened Russia's 3,500 nuclear warheads. He further declared that NATO's eastward expansion represented a military threat to Russia.

Actually, Putin was far from being worried about a military threat from the West. At the time, he was deeply anxious about whether the West would accept the legitimacy of his plan to hand the presidency to his chosen successor. During that politically difficult period, Putin tried to engage his Western counterparts in a squabble about missiles, as world leaders did back in the 1980s.

Now that this critical period has passed, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates lavished compliments on President-elect Dmitry Medvedev after meeting him last month, and Putin has noticeably toned down his rhetoric. [...]

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It isn't a NATO military threat that is galling the Kremlin. Moscow is angry that no matter how polite Western officials try to be, they still believe that the democracy of Putin's government is not on a par with their own. The West considers Ukraine to be a democracy, but not Russia. In a news conference at which he tried to refute the argument that an expansion of NATO was the equivalent to an expansion of democracy, Putin said, "If this or that country is a NATO member, it claims to be a democracy. But if a country is not [a member of NATO] -- that means it is not a democracy? What kind of drivel is that?"

It is true that from Putin's point of view it must be either drivel or an outright falsehood for a country's candidacy to join a military alliance to be based on the presence of strong democratic institutions rather than the number of troop divisions and warheads it has.

In the end, there is no getting away from the idea that this "values gap" renders futile any attempt to lay a solid foundation on Russia's relationship with the West. In the absence of common values, relationships are formed in the manner of 19th-century German leader Otto von Bismarck, who was more concerned with a country's military potential than its perceived intentions. This is why Putin lives in constant anticipation that the West will play a dirty trick on him, why he cannot honestly formulate the reason for his irritation, and why he is unable to verbalize the rationale behind his never-ending and senseless rants about the Western military threat to Russia.

U.S. President George W. Bush showed greater flexibility than he has in the past by choosing not to leave office on a note of conflict with Moscow. In Sochi on Sunday, Russia and the United States produced a fairly pointless document titled a Declaration of the Strategic Framework of Russian-American Relations. It is amusing that in the opening lines of the document both sides hurry to convey the same thing they declared 28 years ago -- namely, that the relationship between the two sides was not confrontational in character. Putin unexpectedly declared that he felt a guarded optimism about the possibility of reaching an agreement over missile defense.

The real cause for Putin's satisfaction, however, was that Bush affirmed the legitimacy of Medvedev as Putin's successor. And this is why Putin can shelve the threat of more Cold War rhetoric -- until it is needed again.

Read the whole article here.

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The Russophobia Scarecrow

My comments on a commentary piece from today's Moscow Times:

The Russophobia Card
by Andrei Tsygankov
Moscow Times, April 3, 2008

The U.S. presidential candidates are increasingly playing the Russophobia card in their campaigns. In addressing Russia, Senators John McCain and Hillary Clinton have resorted to insulting President Vladimir Putin as a KGB spy who has no soul.

The first mistake in the column is an understandable but important one - substituting Putin for Russia. As Anders Aslund has recently noted, taking a dim view of the former does not have to mean one has given up hope for the latter.

After all, the harsh criticism to which Tsygankov refers has been chiefly of Putin and his signature style - and is it really surprising that individuals who are vying for the votes of American citizens would criticize someone who has sought to score political points internationally and at home by employing anti-American rhetoric? Furthermore, while McCain's criticism of Russia has been something of a minor campaign theme, one can discount this at least a bit if one recalls that one of McCain's main goals at this stage is to differentiate his approach to the world from George Bush's in the eyes of the voters. As for the implication that Hillary has been "increasingly" talking about Russia in any way whatsoever, I believe that's simply not the case.

Ironically, Tsygankov actually seems to be accusing McCain and Clinton of filching a page from Putin's campaign playbook. In making the largely unsupportable statement that "[t]he U.S. presidential candidates are increasingly playing the Russophobia card in their campaigns," he seems to be suggesting an atmosphere which is the mirror image of the crescendo of anti-Americanism which accompanied Russia's recent Duma and Presidential elections.

Russophobia is truly back into fashion, as Senator Joseph Biden admitted last week in a comment published in The Wall Street Journal.

That is an interesting gloss on Biden's column, which actually observed that "[b]y suppressing dissent, fueling suspicion of the West, and bullying smaller neighbors, the Putin administration has managed to undermine Moscow's prestige and bring Russophobia back into fashion." Far from being the reluctant admission of Russophobia implied by Tsygankov, Biden's column was at least the second in the last month to appear in a major American newspaper with proposals on how to improve the bilateral relationship - and, more importantly, acknowledging that "[w]hatever the American strategy has been, it clearly isn't working." This suggests that – rather than the environment of rampant Russophobia implied by Tsygankov – the American establishment’s thinking on Russia can be characterized by a growing recognition that each side bears some of the blame for the dysfunctional relationship and that a search for new solutions is necessary, but that an optimistic approach to the future is still possible.

The attacks on Putin and President-elect Dmitry Medvedev are widely supported in mainstream U.S. media. This demagoguery also extends to scholarly publications, such as "The New Cold War" by Edward Lucas, who claims that "Russia's vengeful, xenophobic and ruthless rulers have turned the sick man of Europe into a menacing bully." Just published, the book is getting a lot of publicity and is treated as a serious treatise by influential organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations.

I think it's more accurate to say that Lucas's book is being received as what it is - long-form journalism with elements of contemporary history and analysis, an editorial slant that's easy to oversimplify, and footnotes. Here is what Lucas himself said about his book:

"I'm absolutely not saying that the old Cold War is coming back. That had three dimensions. You mentioned military, ideology -- and it was global confrontation -- this one isn't -- and the Soviet Union then was a closed society. Russia is now very well integrated inter -- both world diplomatic structures and of course the economy and constant human contact. I'm absolutely not making that argument nor am I saying that Putin is a new Stalin. That would be grotesquely exaggerated.

But what I am saying is that we have been much too complacent, for a start, about both where Russia is -- has already got to and what the trajectory is -- that it sort of creeps up on us and things that seemed unimaginable then became isolated exceptions, then become -- happening rather more often and then suddenly become part of everyday life in Putin's Russia, and this has really been extremely troubling and so one thing I want to do is just give a wakeup call."

To be fair, I have heard Lucas compare Putin's rule to that of Hitler. But consider that in the Anglo-American world it is people like Lucas who make such statements about Russia, whereas in the Russian-speaking world it is people like Putin and members of his administration who make similar statements about America (this is, of course, in addition to the gaggle of reflexively anti-American commentators who receive top billing in the Russian media). And in his column about the supposed rise of American Russophobia, Tsygankov neglects to mention the fact that Lucas, um, isn't American.

Despite the anti-Russia rhetoric, many U.S. politicians feel that Russia doesn't matter in the global arena. Instead, they are preoccupied with other international issues, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. But Russia should matter, particularly in a world of new security threats and growing energy competition. The attitude of ignorance and self-righteousness toward Russia tells us volumes about the U.S. unpreparedness for the central challenges of the 21st century.

Tsygankov criticizes American political and media elites for their ignorant and arrogant approach to Russia. I don’t disagree with his assertions in this regard, but I don’t understand how Americans applying an approach to Russia which is sadly typical of the American approach to all foreign lands adds up to "Russophobia." Unfortunately, it has often seemed that simple neglect and short-sightedness have been to blame for America’s policy missteps with regard to Russia, rather than the sort of anti-Russian conspiracy suggested by Tsygankov. And when Russia's head of state goes out of his way to be stridently anti-American in his public statements, is it any wonder that Americans who are not specialists in foreign relations – and even some who are – fail to see how the U.S.-Russian relationship could actually be a fruitful one for both sides?

Then Tsygankov ranges dangerously close to the realm of unhinged conspiracy theorists:

Russophobia's revival is indicative of the fear shared by some U.S. and European politicians that their grand plans to control the world's most precious resources and geostrategic sites may not succeed if Russia's economic and political recovery continues.

I never know how to respond to statements like this. It's like trying to convince a small child that there aren't any monsters under the bed. If someone really believes this sort of thing, they won't be convinced otherwise.

One Russophobic group, exemplified by McCain, includes military hawks or advocates of U.S. hegemony who fought the Cold War not to contain the Soviet enemy but to destroy it by all means available.

This comment at Russia Blog suggests that more sensible responses to McCain's Russia policy are possible than simply waving in the direction of his team's Cold War vintage.

The second group is made up of "liberal hawks" who have gotten comfortable with the weakened and submissive Russia of the 1990s. They have an agenda of promoting U.S.-style democracy and market economy. The fact that the Soviet threat no longer exists has only strengthened their sense of superiority.

To be honest, I don't relish the idea of the McCainiac approach to Russia becoming U.S. policy, and I have concerns about the potential for a "back to the future" scenario under Obama (advised on Russia by Michael McFaul, who can sort of be seen as an embodiment of America's 1990s approach to Russia) or Clinton (the name says it all). But does Tsygankov really think that Obama himself, for example, really noticed or "got[] comfortable with" a weak and submissive Russia in the 1990s, before he was even in the Senate?

Finally there are lobbyists representing East European nationalists who have worked in concert with ruling elites of East and Central European nations to oppose Russia's state consolidation of power as well as promote NATO expansion, deployment of elements of a U.S. missile-defense system in Poland and Czech Republic, and energy pipelines circumventing Russia. These groups have diverse but compatible objectives of isolating Russia from European and U.S. institutions. Because of a lack of commitment to a strong relationship with Russia in the White House, a largely uninformed public and the absence of a Russian lobby within the United States, the influence that these groups exert on policymaking has been notable.

All that's missing is a mention of the Captive Nations Committee, a favorite bugbear of those who believe Russia is forever being needlessly maligned by malevolent busybodies of East European ethnicity based in Washington. Actually, snarkiness aside, I tend to agree with Tsygankov that the relatively rapid NATO expansion of the 1990s and since represented a triumph of interest group politics over what should have been seen as one of the U.S.'s overriding national interests - a cordial relationship with Russia.

Interestingly, Tsygankov laments the lack of a Russia lobby in the U.S. but does not note the cause. In Alexei Pankin's words, "People inside the Russian president’s administration or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose professional duty makes them responsible for shaping Russia’s image" display "the distinctive characteristic of the current regime’s mentality, utterly suspicious of independent initiatives and those who are not asking for money but offering all kinds of opportunities. It freely allocates funds as a form of reward for some sort of service to the administration, but not a means to achieve a goal." The ineffectual attempts to create a Russia lobby showcase the downside of having the unbridled accumulation of personal wealth as a substitute for a national idea.

Russophobia is not in U.S. national interests and is not supported by the American public. Various polls demonstrate that Americans do not agree with the assessment that Russia is a threat to the United States' values and interests. A recent BBC World Service poll revealed, for example, that 45 percent of Americans have a mainly positive attitude regarding Russia's influence in the world, compared with 36 percent who have a mainly negative attitude.

I couldn't agree more. This suggests, though, that Tsygankov's concern may be misplaced and that Americans don't actually listen too closely to what our presidential candidates say about issues like Russia policy. And why should we? It's not as though most Americans decide who to vote for based on foreign policy issues, with the notable exception of Iraq.

Yet Russophobia-driven groups have generally succeeded in feeding the media an image of Russia as an increasingly dangerous regime.

I can imagine which groups Tsygankov has in mind; still, this sentence might have been more convincing if he had named some of them. More likely, he didn't name them because - in any context other than a column in a Moscow newspaper read by people whose interests center on Russia - suggesting that groups with worldwide activities like Freedom House, RFE/RL, Reporters Without Borders, CEIP, and Heritage, all of which are sometimes accused of fanning the flames of Russophobia, are motivated in large part by an irrational fear of Russia (which is, after all, what "Russophobia" means) would be ludicrous.

Thousands of reports in the mainstream U.S. media implicate the Kremlin and Putin personally in murdering opposition journalists and defected spies. Only a handful of reports in less prominent outlets question such interpretations.

"Thousands"? That is an assertion that cries out for substantiation. Reports offering a more positive take on the Putin years - or at least a sober explanation of his popularity - only appear in "less prominent outlets"? That must be news to the New York Times.

Although it matters greatly which candidate will enter the White House in November, the more important issue is whether there will be a fundamental psychological adjustment in Washington away from Russophobia.

To be sure, the healing of the U.S. Russophobic mindframe is going to require a lot of time. Winston Churchill once commented that U.S. politicians "always do the right thing in the end. They just like to exhaust all the alternatives first." If this indeed is the case, we will not see a framework for meaningful cooperation with Russia any time soon.

Here, our columnist quite simply has things backwards. No matter who is elected president, "Russophobia" will not be a major plank in their campaign platform, nor is it quite the major element of the DC zeitgeist that Tsygankov suggests. Even McCain could be expected, optimistically, to allow cooler heads to prevail and avoid sudden moves. Anti-Americanism in Russia, on the other hand, is a defining characteristic of the country's foreign policy and was a key element of Putin's campaign appearances on behalf of United Russia. So, assuming Tsygankov is talking about what matters for the U.S.-Russia relationship, healing would seem to be more urgently needed in Moscow than in Washington.

I found this column disturbing enough to be worthy of such a lengthy response because it appears in the Moscow Times at a moment when the bilateral relationship appears to be at a fork in the road, and some in Moscow may believe that Tsygankov's kaleidoscope - in which isolated critical comments about Putin by McCain and Clinton are multiplied by reflection into a full-blown campaign of "increasing" Russophobia - is a valid lens through which to view the American political and media scene, which could bolster the arguments of those in Russia who would prefer to prolong the nostalgia-inducing atmosphere of Cold-War-style posturing which has gone on for too long already.

As a linguistic aside, it is interesting to note the origin of the phrase chosen for the title of this column (whether by its author or by the MT opinion-page editor). According to Wikipedia, "In the first, and more common context," an accusation of "playing the race card" "alleges that someone has falsely accused another person of being a racist in order to gain some sort of advantage." Since accusations of Russophobia are often trotted out in an effort to deflect attention from legitimate criticism of Russian policies, the title seems unintentionally apt.

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