I decided to type up my notes from a talk I went to a month ago (on April 22) titled, “Recent Russian Policies in Georgia: How Should the West Respond?” and presented by the Johns Hopkins SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. You can listen to the audio from the event here and read a more timely write-up of the event here. The account below is as close to a transcript as I could come without listening to the recording. I have added some minimal editorializing in the footnotes at the very end.
Bakradze emphasized that the de facto government structures with which Russia is cooperating in Abkhazia were formed as a result of the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from the region. Accepting the legitimacy of these structures amounts to the legitimization of the results of ethnic cleansing and is a very dangerous development which removes the chances of the Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return home. This is a new reality which could change the situation on the ground, as Georgia may not be able to control the situation with the IDPs.[1] Bakradze estimated the population of Abkhazia today as consisting of 45,000 Abkhaz, 45,000 Russians and Armenians, and roughly 50,000 Georgians.[2]
The changes in Russian policy have had a military component as well, which was part of Russia’s decision in March to withdraw from the trade restrictions and sanctions imposed by the CIS in 1996.[3] Bakradze noted that Georgia had never stopped humanitarian intercourse with Abkhazia, rather the 1996 document prohibited a military buildup but allowed ties and communications with other countries through Georgia.
Russia has now freed its hands to establish an increased military presence in Abkhazia, as evidenced by the recent downing of the Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Bakradze explained that the Georgian UAV had been deployed because de facto President Bagapsh had declared an intention to undertake military activity in the Kodori and Gali regions to UNOMIG, but UNOMIG has no UAVs of its own with which to monitor the situation.
Bakradze stated that it was a Russian MiG-29 which shot down the Georgian UAV and that the plane then flew back to Russia. Georgia has radar records and the video from the UAV to prove this. Russia therefore has an illegal military presence on Georgian territory. The MiG-29 stationed at Gudauta is a clear violation of the CFE and the Istanbul Commitments because the Gudauta facility is supposed to be closed. Russia committed an act of aggression by shooting down an unarmed UAV in Georgian airspace. Russia’s recent steps, then, have included military steps in addition to attempts to legalize its creeping annexation of Georgia.
Considering the potential resolution of the conflict, Georgia is faced with a difficult choice in deciding how to react to these recent developments. There is huge public pressure from groups such as the IDPs to react. Georgia has not responded with confrontation, to the contrary Saakashvili has advanced new peace proposals. Abkhazia was offered the chance to designate the vice-president in a reunified country and a veto over any government decision involving Abkhazia as well as a guarantee of Abkhazian autonomy. Georgia’s goal has been to show maximum restraint by avoiding harsh rhetoric or military responses and asking for the international community to act diplomatically.
Bakradze then listed Georgia’s main goals which he planned to articulate at the UN the following day. First, Russia should reverse its two recent decisions on withdrawing from the sanctions regime and on direct legal relations with Abkhazia’s de facto authorities. Second, Russia and the international community should support Georgia’s peace plan. Third, UNOMIG’s capability should be increased to include border and airspace monitoring. Fourth, Georgia plans to emphasize the issue of ethnic cleansing, since it should provide a “safeguard” preventing Russia from legally cooperating with the de facto authorities.
In addition, Europe should call on Russia to not only not implement the decision on legal cooperation but to reverse the decision, because the decision changes the reality on the ground. Since Putin will be the prime minister, the decision – taken in his decree made as president – will be implemented if not reversed. Overall, the recent developments present a test to the international community to see how decisive it will be in a crisis situation (because that is what the annexation of neighboring territory is).
Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza
Matthew Bryza stated that his goal was to provide the US perspective on these “recent and extremely serious events.” Many elements require attention, but overall the situation is very serious and has presented a test for Georgia – to rework its peace proposal – as well as a test for Russia and a test for the US Where Russian policy will go is unpredictable. US policy will continue to be to help Georgia to restore its territorial integrity peacefully.
Unfortunately it does not look like the Friends process [4] can move things forward. The group has looked at the conflict from the bottom up and undertaken “below grass roots” activities, but tends to get bogged down in small details and doesn’t deal with the big issues (e.g., of the security of returned IDPs in the Gali region) and political settlement. 200-300,000 IDPs remain displaced, and the question now is about sales of property which belongs to the IDPs. Such sales are not only unfair but destabilizing and create tension.
Bryza mentioned some aspects of the situation in South Ossetia, where Russian officials have been seconded to the local de facto authorities and Russia has hooked the region up to its telephone and natural gas networks, not to mention the billboard in Tskhinvali showing Putin and captioned “Nash Prezident” [“Our President”] – all while Russia officially recognizes Georgia’s territorial integrity.
Russia has come right up to the edge of recognition but has stopped short. Offices to serve the interests of the Russian citizens in Abkhazia will be opened on Russian territory, but just across the border. Russia will recognize the legitimacy of documents and decisions of the Abkhazian authorities. This blurs the border between recognition and non-recognition of independence and is not in keeping with the mediating sentiment of the Friends process and with Russia’s role as the facilitator in the conflict resolution process.
The US always encourages Georgia to stay peaceful, but meanwhile Russia is lifting restrictions on military transfers to Abkhazia and recognizing the decisions and documents of its de facto authorities. Georgia is urged not to try to change the format of the Friends process, but that process keeps moving backwards. Georgia needs to make its peace plan more appealing to Abkhazia but seems to be reacting with appropriate calm.
The negotiations have spent years batting around confidence-building measures, people-to-people approaches, economic cooperation, etc., but it’s past time to be talking about a political settlement at this point. The US encourages Georgia to take steps on South Ossetia which have been recommended by Russia – in the areas of security (to reduce tension) and economy (to increase prosperity) – these steps have been taken already – and politics.
Russia’s “deplorable” action in shooting down the Georgian UAV was clearly not in keeping with its role in the UN Friends process. Bryza observed that things seem to be moving in the wrong direction and that the resolution process needs to be rejuvenated, at the same time the US needs to “call things like we see them.” He referred to the missile incident last August and the “absurd” idea that “Georgia attacked itself.” Although there may never be “smoking-gun intel reports,” there is an accumulation of circumstantial evidence (including, e.g., the March 11, 2007 Kodori attack) [of Russian involvement].
Was the UAV’s flight illegal under the 1994 cease-fire agreement? Who knows, but Georgia needs to be able to observe what is going on in order to know that it doesn’t need to take military action. More intelligence would reinforce stability. Why not have more OSCE military monitors in South Ossetia? Why not give Georgia joint administration of the Roki Tunnel?
Georgia has its own work to do as well – it needs to make its settlement plan attractive to the separatists (Georgia is not a “darling” here). Bryza reminded the audience that the Abkhazian quest is for independence, to not be a part of either Georgia or Russia. Georgia needs to show them there is nothing to fear.
Remarks by Vladimir Socor
Jamestown Foundation senior fellow Vladimir Socor began by stating that he would have five observations about Russian policy and five policy recommendations. He observed that Russia’s affirmations of Georgia’s territorial integrity were only real in the sense that Russia does not formally claim any Georgian territory. Otherwise, those declarations are contradicted by Russia’s steps on the ground. Under Putin, there has been creeping annexation: Russian citizenship was given to residents of the region en masse, unlawfully under both Russian and international law; appointment by Russia of local leaders; and property takeovers, arms handovers, use of transit routes. Russia’s policy is now to pose a territorial claim to Georgian land in terms of Russian law – not in terms of international law – as Russian government bodies will conduct relations with Abkhazian bodies.
Socor’s first observation was that Putin’s decree of April 16 capped Russia’s policy of creeping annexation of Abkhazia. It turns an unofficial policy into a semi-official policy. The response should not focus on the decree, because it doesn’t have validity under international law. The international community should demand the reversal of Russia’s policy of creeping annexation, because otherwise the situation will not return to normal.
Second, Putin’s decree moves the process of de facto annexation onto pseudo-legal grounds in terms of Russian law. This should disqualify Russia from its role as a peacekeeper and mediator in the region – it does more than just put Russia’s role into question, it had already been in question as Russia has never been neutral in the conflict. It is impossible or perhaps counterproductive to exclude Russia from the peacekeeping and negotiation formats, but the formats need to be transformed with more international involvement. Russia’s recent move has made a mockery of the current formats.
Third, Russia has for the first time made an attempt to change post-Soviet borders in an overt way, which could be momentous. The tendency could spread unless checked. There is a need to have international oversight of the Russian-Georgian border, to put it under joint control between Russia, Georgia and maybe the EU or the OSCE. Such proposals have been around, but they need to be considered anew. It is necessary to check border revisionism. Socor raised the topic of Sochi and the upcoming 2014 Olympics – will the international community participate if Russia is changing international borders close by? The Sochi Olympics provide a good context in which to raise the issue.
Socor’s fourth observation was that Russia’s recent steps have been an overt exercise of “hard power.” Putin’s decree doesn’t mention military-to-military contacts, but these are the main instruments of Russian power. The response should be the soft power of the EU The EU likes soft power as a foreign policy tool – the international community needs to appeal to the EU to establish a soft-power presence in Abkhazia, through technical projects or similar initiatives. The EU could also offer visa facilitation to Georgian citizens. As it currently stands, Russian citizens residing in Abkhazia enjoy visa facilitation, but Georgian citizens do not – this erodes the appeal of Georgian citizenship.
Fifth, Russia’s recent steps are a signal to NATO that giving Georgia a MAP will involve
NATO in a clash that could jeopardize NATO-Russia relations. The move is not so much an anti-Georgian move as it is an anti-MAP move. Georgia is indeed in a “danger zone” and should be given a MAP as soon as possible. NATO should not repeat the Acheson mistake of 1950 by defining a perimeter – a MAP would signal Georgia’s presence inside NATO’s perimeter.
Regarding the effect of Kosovo’s UDI, Socor observed that it is ironic, because of Russia’s “lack of a legal culture,” that Russia took a legalistic approach to Kosovo recognition and has made claims that it would set a precedent. The real Kosovo precedent, according to Socor, is of a conflict resolved through the reversal of ethnic cleansing and intervention by international organizations (NATO, the EU, the OSCE). This is the real precedent, not in legal theory but in strategic reality. Reversal of ethnic cleansing should become the basis for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia as well.
Remarks by Svante Cornell, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Research Director
A major issue is how to interpret the Kremlin’s moves in the context of Kosovo. We were led to expect recognition based on the declared legalistic Kosovo precedent, but we may be seeing an intentionally misleading move. Russia’s policies have nothing to do with recognition, they have to do with annexation. Kosovo and Taiwan, for example, are territories open to the world and not being isolated or absorbed into other countries – they are fundamentally different from the situation in Abkhazia. Russia’s moves prevent the self-determination of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The US does not appoint the Interior Minister of Taiwan.[5]
So, it probably has nothing to do with recognition or opening up the territories, they are being cut off. Abkhazian leadership is being humiliated and alarmed by the Russian steps, they realize that Russia has no intention of recognizing them and will use them as anti-NATO pawns.
Cornell went on to describe the relationship of the Abkhazia crisis to US-Russian relations. The Russian moves were mere days after Putin’s summit with Bush in Sochi and after Bush’s heavy rhetorical investment in getting Georgia a MAP. Therefore, Russia’s steps directly confront a stated high-level interest of the US and are a “personal slap in the face” to Bush. The US cannot allow this to happen – forceful reaction is needed. Russia’s next steps may be directed against Ukraine,[6] which would further undermine US credibility.
In Abkhazia, the current peacekeeping and negotiating formats are not working – Russia is now explicitly a party to the conflict and therefore not an appropriate mediator. The recent developments should disqualify Russia from having a peacekeeping role in Abkhazia. The international community should no longer accept the Russian monopoly on the negotiating and peacekeeping processes – it is absurd that a party to the conflict could be a mediator. But what new mechanisms can be introduced? And can the old ones be reformed?
Question-and-answer
The first question was posed to Mr. Socor about what types of technical assistance he thought would be feasible and helpful. He mentioned agriculture, health and infrastructure projects aimed at benefiting the local population, as well as the need to set up a mechanism to oversee Georgian-language schooling in the Gali region. In South Ossetia, cross-border irrigation projects are an option, and the Sanakoyev government could be used to deliver some of the assistance.
Georgia’s European choice, according to Socor, opens up prospects of Europeanization for the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These people now have a window into Europe and away from an exclusively Russocentric environment. The idea would be to use Georgia as a “locomotive”[7] to pull Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Europe – the EU needs to live up to its rhetoric about using soft power to spread European values.
The next question focused on the “Taiwanesque” nature of the scenario, while acknowledging that such terminology is a matter of semantics, and asked what Georgia and the US would do in the event of a military buildup in Abkhazia. Bakradze pointed out that Taiwan is very different from Abkhazia – US-Taiwanese cooperation is carried out with the agreement of the PRC government. He said that he was pleased to have Georgia compared to the PRC, but that the comparison is nevertheless a bad analogy. As for the question about the buildup, Bakradze stated that his response would depend on Bryza’s response.
Socor mentioned the break in the link between the Istanbul Commitments and the CFE Treaty and its relevance to the base at Gudauta. He opined that it was a mistake to ratify the CFE without resolving the issue of “unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment.” International inspection of Gudauta is necessary to be sure that it has been mothballed, but NATO is pulling back from requests like this.
Bryza noted that Russia and others understand that there is no military solution to the problem and that even suggesting one opens a Pandora’s box. There is a great danger of reverberation after the use of force since the region is so interconnected.[8] Georgia also understands this, and no one wants to contemplate a military confrontation. There is a need to rejuvenate the political talks, and Georgia needs to show Abkhazia that they are serious about a settlement. Bakradze mentioned that a Russian military buildup would constitute an open military occupation of part of Georgia and noted that Georgia would do what any other country would do. “It is in Russia’s hands,” but if they undertake a military buildup in Abkhazia then they will back Georgia into a corner.
Andrei Piontkovsky asked about the reactions of other CIS countries to Russia’s withdrawal from the sanctions regime. Bakradze responded that several CIS countries stated they would not join Russia’s decision. Russia, however, has a special status because of its physical presence on the ground and its status in the negotiations, so it is different from any other CIS state.
A representative of the Turkish Embassy recalled Saakashvili’s statement that no MAP for Georgia would amount to appeasement of Russia and asked why, then, would a MAP for Georgia be a deterrent. He also asked whether there was any real chance for productive talks after Abkhazia had swiftly rejected Georgia’s most recent peace proposal, and whether Turkey might play a role in facilitating the process, given the presence of some 400,000 ethnic Abkhaz in Turkey. Socor confirmed that Saakashvili made the statement and remarked that appeasement indeed invites aggression, and that in that respect Russia’s recent actions “agreed” with Saakashvili’s statement, because Russia was emboldened. In past NATO enlargement rounds, Russia pulled back when membership became a reality.
Bakradze observed that the Baltic countries and Poland enjoyed better relations with Russia after their accession to NATO. There are illusions in Moscow about the new situation in the near abroad and about Russia’s sphere of influence. There is a need to reduce uncertainty, because doing so will improve the relationship. Russia is pragmatic – once it sees a reality on the ground, it accepts that reality.
As for Georgia’s peace proposals, Abkhazia’s de facto leaders did not even look at them; but Abkhazia’s leaders should feel uncomfortable, because they may be absorbed. If the region becomes part of Russia, ethnic Abkhaz will be a tiny portion of the population there. Georgia is ready to pay a lot for what the Abkhazians have, otherwise they may wind up giving it away for free. But before talking about negotiations, the conflict needs to be brought back to a frozen condition. Georgia is very open to a Turkish mediation role.
[1] This sounded like a veiled threat of action which might be undertaken by or in the name of the IDPs, who number roughly 200,000, according to generally accepted estimates, or up to 300-350,000 according to some Georgian government estimates.
[2] The population is more likely roughly 180-200,000 and varies significantly depending on whether it is resort season or not. The important point made by Bakradze’s figures and all other estimates I’ve seen is that ethnic Abkhaz do not constitute a majority of the population of the region even after the cleansing of at least 200,000 Georgians.
[3] The terminology used by Abkhazians and many others in referring to these measures is “blockade.” In any event, while Russia formally renounced the restrictions in March of this year, it had been failing to observe them since 2000-01. Presumably one group of individuals who will see a change from the recent change in Russian policy is Russian border guards, who will no longer be able to use the trade restrictions as an excuse to engage in rent-seeking.
[4] Bryza was referring to the long-running discussions under the framework of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, a body which has long been a format for discussing the conflict over Abkhazia, which involves representatives of Germany, France, Russia, the UK and the US.
[5] At this point, Bryza leaned over to Bakradze and said, in a smiling aside loud enough to hear in the first few rows, “That’s what he thinks.” It didn’t seem like the most appropriate venue to make such a joke.
[6] This observation looks pretty prescient in light of Luzhkov’s recent rhetoric about taking back Sevastopol and/or the Crimea.
[7] The exact same suggestion has been made by Romania to Moldova in recent years - it is difficult to imagine that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will find it any more appealing than Moldova did.
[8] This was a not-so-subtle reminder of Russia’s own potential difficulties in controlling ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus. Russia is not always fond of Bryza's comments and actually issued a communique in response to some remarks he made recently while visiting Georgia.
RIA Novosti caption: The USA and the USSR youth
