Unvacation

Since a few of my handful of regular readers may be wondering why I've let the blog go dark at such an eventful time, please allow me to explain. In recent weeks, we've been moving out of our apartment in DC, preparing to move to London. Last Thursday, we left DC for a month's vacation in Moldova, which of course also necessitated a bunch of packing. All of this came right on the heels of the bar exam, and since I had been focused on that all summer I guess I wasn't really prepared to be slapped in the face with all of the tasks presented by a relocation. It is whiny, to say the least, to complain about being stressed out at a time when there's just been a war on and people lost their homes and lives, but there you have it. I have come to think of the past month as my summer unvacation; hopefully the month to come will feel more like a vacation.

Anyway, judging from the sharp increase in visitors to this blog over the last couple of weeks (people have been checking out the maps of the region I've posted recently, especially this one), a lot of people have been using the internet to seek information about the war in Georgia. This may be a good thing or it may not - judging from what I've seen in the few mainstream media outlets I've had time to read/watch/listen to over the course of the conflict (I haven't been online much), only the laziest pundits and pontificators have refrained from weighing in on the crisis. Sometimes it is fruitful to hear a generalist's take on a region one follows closely; but often, it shows that the people who have to say things to fill air time and write things to fill column-inches are not always so careful when it comes to the facts. On just one day last week, reading two op-ed pages, I found a glaring error on each:

The most obvious one was in Richard Cohen's WaPo column from last Tuesday. Spot the mistake:

Peter the Great built his capital to face Europe, and Putin, don't forget, was mayor of St. Petersburg.

I don't think I have to elaborate for regular readers of this blog.

The other flubs were erroneous oversimplifications in a WSJ op-ed titled "How the West Can Stand Up to Russia," written by two guys from AEI, one of whom heads up something called the program on advanced strategic studies. Perhaps he operates on such an advanced level that he finds small details to be irrelevant when making sweeping generalizations; unfortunately, the history of the conflicts in Georgia is laden with seemingly trivial details and distinctions which turn out to be crucial to understanding what has actually happened there and what one can hope for in the future. Two passages from this piece caught my eye - here's the first:

Starting in 2004, Russia began issuing passports to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a fact that today serves as one of the main pretexts for the ferocity of Moscow's military campaign.

The authors are absolutely right to touch on this issue, which had often been glossed over in mainstream media accounts of the conflict but can no longer be ignored even by the press now that, for example, Medvedev named the goal of protecting "Russian Federation citizens" first when listing Russia's goals in going to war with Georgia in a public statement last week. I have done a lot of research on this interesting issue as it relates to Abkhazia (see a brief write-up of it here, a publication is forthcoming soon), and peak period when Russian passports were being handed out there was actually in 2002.

This may seem trivial, except that it undermines one of the authors' points, namely that Russia became substantially more hostile toward Georgia once Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze. Hostility did increase, of course, based on Russia's aversion to colored revolutions and perhaps on the now well known personal beef between Putin and Saak, but Russia was quite willing to work on drawing Georgia's secessionist regions closer to its breast by handing out passports even under Shevardnadze.

If one can pinpoint a turning point in Russia's approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it was not so much the Rose Revolution as it was Russia's pacification of Chechnya, after which Russia - having ensured its own territorial integrity - began to seem more willing to undermine that of its neighbor. Unfortunately, these authors prefer to emphasize a false narrative of the Shevardnadze period as some pro-Russian continuation of "Soviet Georgia" (meanwhile, I recall attending a speech by Shevardnadze at Harvard back in 2000 or 2001 when he was so pro-U.S. it made me uncomfortable) and Saakashvili as Georgia's democratic savior. The truth is, of course, far more complex.

The second flawed passage from the op-ed was this one:

[T]he West should make use of Russia's claim that its role in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is driven by the need to protect the populations there. If so, Moscow should have no objections to U.N.-sanctioned peacekeepers and observers moving into those two regions to replace the jerry-rigged system of "peacekeepers" that, until the war broke out, consisted of Russian troops, local separatist militaries and Georgian forces.

I tend to agree that an international peacekeeping force in both regions would be an excellent next step, although Russia is unlikely to allow it and the West cannot exactly just parachute one in. Also, it's an open question whether any Western nations would be prepared to contribute troops to such a force. More importantly, the authors of the piece appear to assume similar peacekeeping situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. De facto, it's true that in both regions the Russian "peacekeeping" forces have failed to keep up even the pretense of neutrality.

Formally, however, it's important to remember that the Russian forces in Abkhazia are there under a UN mandate (I've heard this was a quid pro quo for Russia agreeing to the deployment of US peacekeepers in Haiti) and are observed by a contingent of actual blue-helmets (the Russian press often refers to its semi-legitimate peacekeepers as "blue-helmets," but they are not in fact UN forces) under the command of UNOMIG. The peacekeeping structure in South Ossetia since the end of hostilities has been formally administered by the OSCE and by its very structure has been less favorable to Georgia.

Pointing out the difference may seem like a nitpick, but details are important in a scrap over a region where the population is only 70,000 (a fact which, by the way, makes all of the comparisons to Kosovo - where the population is roughly 30 times larger - seem a bit ridiculous). In any event, while it's an accurate description of the pre-war situation in South Ossetia, it's more than misleading - it's flat-out wrong - to suggest that the description of a peacekeeping system of "Russian troops, local separatist militaries and Georgian forces" ever applied to Abkhazia.

Since I'm not going to have time to do any sort of roundup or collection of my own thoughts on the crisis (which are, at the moment, as jumbled as the situation on the ground in Georgia), I will conclude with a few links to internet resources with worthwhile coverage.

[image source]

First of all, my friends at Global Voices Online have shown the strength of GVO's format by setting up a special page devoted to coverage of the conflict over South Ossetia and keeping it updated. Second, the New York Times has a dedicated topical page, which includes a link to their blog on the conflict, which links to various other bloggers covering the story, such as Paul Goble at Window on Eurasia. The NYT Moscow bureau's LiveJournal community collected comments on the crisis from Russian bloggers here and here. Also, the coverage by IWPR (including this Russian-language blog) - one of the most balanced internet resources on the region in times of peace and war alike - should not be missed, especially the wisdom of long-time Caucasus observer Tom de Waal.

If you're looking for the Russian point of view, check out RIA Novosti's topical page or this collection of official Russian government pronouncements.

Finally, here are some links compiled and circulated by the International Relations and Security Network in Zurich:

Media
Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault, Christian Science Monitor
Georgia-Russia Conflict, by the BBC
In Depth: South Ossetia Crisis, by Financial Times

Blog posts
Putin's revenge, by FP Passport
Kosovo and South Ossetia, by Outside the Beltway
Danger Room: Georgia under online assault, by Wired
The Russian press, by the Duck of Minerva
Georgia, Russia and rethinking China, by the Oil and the Glory
Georgia, from the American side, by Registan.net

Publications
Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Make Haste Slowly, by the International Crisis Group
Russia / North Ossetia: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, by swisspeace
Tbilisi Withdraws from the Joint Control Commission; Proposes New Format for South Ossetia, by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program (CACI-SRSP)
Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia’s Policy Towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Context of the Internal and International Situation, by the Centre for Eastern Studies (CES)

Primary resources
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (PDF)
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (Audio)
Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, 14 May 1994 (PDF)
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict, 4 April 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 876: Abkhazia, Georgia, 19 October 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 881: Abkhazia, Georgia, 4 November 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 892: Abkhazia, Georgia, 22 December 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 896: On Possible Establishment of Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia, Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Abkhazia Conflict, 31 January 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 906: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 25 March 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 993: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, 12 May 1995 (PDF)

Maps
Republic of Georgia Maps, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Online Maps of Current Interest, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Russia and Georgia at War: Day 2, by Daily Mail
Georgia, by the BBC
Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region, by Perry-Castañeda Library

____________________________________

And a postscript: I wrote most of this post last Thursday but then wasn't able to complete and post it before taking off for the airport. Last night, thanks to the miracle of the Russian media sphere (perhaps a more powerful influence than the CIS in the post-Soviet space) I was able to watch the Sunday evening Vesti and Vremia roundups, which from what I could tell dealt almost solely with the conflict over South Ossetia.

The coverage was amazing in several ways. First, both my wife and I had moments where we walked into the room having heard a voice on TV without seeing the speaker, certain it was Putin. In both cases, it turned out to be the new, improved Medvedev, who seems to have repackaged his speaking style to be a tough, trash-talking clone of the man who installed him in the presidency.

Second, I was quite impressed with Vremia's use of footage from CNN and Russia Today - the effect was to legitimize the Russian government's position and ORT's coverage by, for example, broadcasting remarks by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov not as filmed or interviewed by ORT, but as they appeared on CNN. The Russian PR machine has become much slicker since I last regularly watched the main TV news programs a couple of years ago.

Finally, while I don't think any YouTube clips ridiculing Russia's leaders have made it onto the government-owned channels recently, one of them (I can't remember which) aired at great length a mash-up making out Saakashvili to be basically a paranoid madman. No word on whether the producer of the clip was one of the Kremlin's media-making sausage factories or an actual amateur netizen.

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Getting a job - and an education - in the new Russia

Translated from barabanch (original is here):

A young lady came to interview for a job with a friend of mine.
She's a "Young Russia" activist.

Under "Professional Accomplishments" [on her resume] the one and only line read "Participated in the inauguration of Dmitry Anatol'evich Medvedev."

A couple of comments on the post:

by avdeev [my translation, punctuation as in original]:

it's funny, but things like that have been happening for awhile
for example at RGGU they accept [United Russia] party members into the graduate programs, and it's harder for people who haven't been vetted by the office to get in [...]

a couple of my friends were advised by the academic department that before turning in their grad school applications they should pay a visit to the [local United Russia] office, that it would be more correct and predictable to do so

at the office it was suggested that they write an essay about how much I love the motherland, i.e. [United Russia], and how much I want to join the party, well they told [United Russia] to go you-know-where and they submitted their applications anyway, we'll see what happens in September

by el_cambio:

You don't understand.

[quoting from here, which also seems to have been quoted from a transcript of some kind:] Speaking at [a panel discussion on "the new Russian elite" at the "Strategy-2020 Forum"], Vladislav Surkov called on the participants in the discussion to "determine what the Russian elite is." In response to this, producer Andrei Fomin suggested compiling a "list of the elite," and the Andrei Korkunov, general director of the Odintsovo candy factory, noted that such a list already exists, and pointed out the list of participants in the presidential inauguration in the Kremlin.

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Looking back on Russia Day, a month later

The Washington Post's report, illustrated by my photo of the ice bear, followed by some personal observations:

At Russian Embassy, Vodka & Good Wishes Flow

By Amy Argetsinger and Roxanne Roberts

Thursday, June 12, 2008; Page C3

What this town needs is more vodka at noon. To celebrate Russia Day, the embassy invited 2,000 friends yesterday afternoon for vodka, music, caviar . . . and did we mention vodka?

Of course, we couldn't refuse. After almost 10 years in Washington, Ambassador Yuri Ushakov was tapped last week to become Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's deputy chief of staff -- a big deal, since Ushakov will oversee foreign-policy and economic issues. He heads back to Moscow on Saturday, so the reception turned into an impromptu farewell party.

Vodka at lunch? "We're celebrating," Ushakov told us. "Why not? It's permitted."

Well, sure! Technically, we were on Russian soil. There was a giant ice sculpture of a bear holding big (actual) bottles of booze, a band playing Russian folk songs, and generals mingling with diplomats and policy wonks. Waiters lined up with trays filled with shots; bartenders poured three different brands of vodka (each with subtle differences -- it was our duty to check) plus various alcohol-based concoctions. The only thing keeping people standing were vast buffets groaning with food.

Shortly after 2 p.m., guests were gently herded toward the door, where staffers passed out cute little vodka mini-bottles. One woman nodded to her companion approvingly: "Vas goot function."

It was indeed a good function - not to mention a great promo for the vodka purveyors - a fun way to spend the early afternoon and celebrate Russia here in the US at a time when there aren't quite enough good vibes in the bilateral relationship. I wish I'd photographed them better, but here are a couple of interesting bulletin boards that the Embassy had up to illustrate highlights of modern Russian politics and of the US-Russian/Soviet relationship over the years:

This was what one would expect - displays of superpower parity and cooperation: Yalta, Ike/Nixon/Khrushchev, Bush 41 and Gorby, Bush 43 and Putin, Clinton and Yeltsin (less prominently, of course), astronauts, military/athletic/scientific cooperation, etc. But also, perhaps less expectedly, Angela Davis.

And the Embassy's portrayal of Russia's leadership - presumably, this is part of what we were celebrating:

Some Putin, but more Medvedev, with the latter's showily pious wife also prominently featured (perhaps the idea is to appeal to Americans' presumed religiosity, or perhaps just to illustrate Russia's Orthodox "renaissance"). Many if not most of these photos look like they were from Medvedev's inauguration ceremony.

Embassy staff gave guests a colorful greeting and send-off:


And finally, here is what we all should have been celebrating, since it's shared economic interests which can hopefully pull the US-Russian relationship through various political storms:

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Russian TV online

An earlier post on this topic has proven to be quite a magnet for Google searches - apparently many people share my interest in watching Russian TV over the internet.

Previously, I offered one option for watching a wide array of post-Soviet TV programming online; now I'd like to plug a site which I recently saw for the first time and which seems to allow one to watch three major networks' evening news shows (with a slight delay) for free, albeit in a small-screen preview format. The site is logically called "Russian TV Online," and it allowed me to observe what seems to be (though perhaps I'm misremembering his earlier style) Prez. Medvedev's newly Putinized deeper-voiced, shorter-sentence-using style of speech delivery in his remarks at a couple of the photo ops with CIS leaders in St. Petersburg.

At least on NTV, though, Putin made it onto the broadcast earlier...though I suppose a sample size of one doesn't really allow me to draw any broader conclusions.

For more reading roughly related to this topic, check out a much longer recent post here as well as the relatively recent (from 2006) issue of Pro et Contra dedicated to the theme of "[Russian] Television in Search of Ideology."

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Echoes of Victory Day and the Inauguration

I happened to catch a re-run of the Daily Show a week or two ago and saw Jon Stewart's hilarious and surprisingly on-point riff on the Victory Day parade and Medvedev's inauguration ceremony. Transcribing selected sound bites from the clip wouldn't do it justice - just watch it and laugh:

That - as well as the return of the outstanding Darkness at Noon, which is back on line and has posted an original video of the V-Day festivities in Moscow, inspired me to corral a few links to online material on the events in Moscow of four weeks or so ago.

CSIS's Sarah Mendelson wrote a "critical questions" brief about the significance of the re-militarization of the Victory Day celebrations, which included a brief digression down memory lane, as Mendelson recalled attending a Soviet military parade in late 1990.

Global Voices Online had roundups about both the inauguration and Victory Day. And the always interesting Wu Wei has an interesting account of what it was like to watch Medvedev's inauguration on Georgian TV.

[Update June 15: I wanted to direct readers as well to this link which fell through the cracks - Oleg Panfilov's brief comments stating that the question of who has the upper hand as between Putin and Medvedev will become clear when one of the two begins to enjoy an advantage in TV coverage.]

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Pondering the prospects for a post-Putin "perestroika"

[image source]

I found this article fascinating - hopeful and yet pessimistic at the same time, it perhaps relies too much on comparisons with the USSR and makes a conclusion that may be too bold. But its author, an emigre sociologist and a long-time and prolific commentator on life and public opinion in the USSR and Russia, makes a number of important points in arriving at that conclusion.

Johnson's Russia List
27 May 2008
How the new Russian President could start a new Perestroika with friendly trips to the capitals of neighboring countries
By Vladimir Shlapentokh
Michigan State University

[...]

[M]aintaining the image of the world as an enemy of Russia is a crucial way to legitimize current regime, along with the political stability in the country. The imperial ideology exploits the nostalgia of many Russians for the great empire and abets nationalism. It pits the population against foreign countries, treating them as hostile toward Russia and its integrity, and as working against the restoration of the country’s previous geopolitical role. In order to maintain a climate of patriotic agitation and divert the people from the country’s real problems, Russian politicians and journalists talk incessantly about “great Russia,” “Russia’s great past,” and “the great victory in 1945.” It is remarkable that, on the official site of the Russian president (2000-2007), the adjective “great” was mentioned more than 3000 times.

The practicality of the imperial ideology is seen in the fact that up to 85 percent of the population, according to a survey by the BBC at the beginning of 2008, responded positively, in one way or another, to the xenophobic propaganda of the Kremlin and its foreign policy. In fact, the ruling elite do not possess other ideological ways to influence the minds of most Russians. Alternative ideological fundamentals, such as private property and the market economy (in April 2008, Medvedev underscored their importance for Russia), are not attractive at all to the majority of the population, which hates the corrupt bureaucrats and their illegal fortunes. Only 10 percent of the population, according to a survey by Levada’s polling firm conducted in November 2007, declared that they “respect people who became rich in the last 10-15 years.”

Only the imperial ideology allowed the Kremlin to pursue its deeply antidemocratic domestic policy and disregard the growing social inequality in the country. This ideology justifies the supremacy of the “national leader” and the mistreatment of democratic institutions. It presents the members of the opposition as almost foreign agents and makes it impossible for Western organizations, such as the British Council, to function in Russia. It justifies the rude intervention of the state in the activities of foreign companies, such as British Petroleum, which cannot protect their interests against Russian competitors. It helps persecute the Protestant Church in Russia as an American agent. The imperial ideology also treats Stalin as its main hero and maintains his positive image by silencing the media’s coverage of the mass terror in Soviet times.

In fact, the imperial ideology is only meant for a domestic audience and its influence on the relations with foreign countries is rather limited. The case involving the USA is typical. During the parliamentary (December 2007) and presidential (March 2008) elections, the volume of anti-American propaganda was extremely high. However, this propaganda did relatively little to deteriorate the relations between the two countries and in no way prevented the cordial meeting between Bush and Putin in Sochi where they, like a loving couple, went to see the sunset on the Black Sea on March 27.

In order to restart Russia’s move toward democracy, it is vitally important to break the spine of the imperial ideology. Germany and Japan, after the war, would not have been able to take the road toward democracy without a resolute and consistent rejection of the ideology of supremacy, militarism and expansionism.

The most peculiar fact is that a radical change of foreign policy is much easier than doing the same in domestic affairs. This is exactly what should be on Medvedev’s mind, if he wishes to be a liberal and not one of Putin’s clones. Medvedev seemingly understands the danger of using “greatness” as the central postulate of the official ideology. In April 2008, Nikolai Svanidze, a known Russian journalist, asked Medvedev, “What does great Russia mean to you?” Putin’s heir answered, “Russia, without doubt, is a great country.” However, he then called upon the Russians “not to be intoxicated” with the idea of “greatness” and to look soberly at the real position of Russia in the world.

Many liberals are waiting for the release from prison of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an oligarch jailed by Putin for his political ambitions. However, Medvedev would have a more difficult time releasing Khodorkovsky than attacking the imperial ideology. As a matter of fact, liberalizations in post-Stalin Russia began in this area. Even before Khrushchev’s famous speech about Stalin’s atrocities at the Twentieth Party Congress, he proclaimed a policy of peaceful coexistence and undertook a number of actions that radically changed Soviet foreign policy. He was instrumental in the achievement of the armistice in Korea in 1953 and the peace in Indochina in 1954. Then, in 1955, he made a trip to Yugoslavia and apologized for Stalin’s policy toward this country and its leader Josip Tito. Then (still in 1955 and before “the thaw”) he reduced the Soviet army.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign deeds also preceded his domestic liberal policy. Before the Soviet people and the world understood Gorbachev’s democratic intentions, which did not become clear until 1987, the new Soviet leader met with Reagan in November 1985, only a few months after his ascension to power. This meeting marked the beginning of the warming of relations between the two superpowers. It was followed by a new meeting with the American president in the next year in Reykjavik. By 1987, the USSR and USA prepared a treaty on the elimination of short- and middle-range missiles.

The experiences of Khrushchev and Gorbachev might serve as a playbook for the new president, if he had the guts to turn toward the democratic road. In fact, the major obstacle to democratization is the Kremlin’s support for the imperial and nationalist ideology.

Ironically, the key element of the imperial ideology and Russian foreign policy that should be attacked by a new reformer is not the animosity against the West, the USA or Europe. The hatred of Russia’s neighboring countries (the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia, and former satellites such as Poland) plays a much more important role today. For instance, in April­May 2008, Russian media talked much more about the perfidious Georgia than England, which now, after the Litvinenko case, is also treated as a committed enemy of Russia. What is more, the media talked about Georgia almost as much as it did about NATO, which is seen as another one of the country’s fierce enemies. Indeed, between April 21 and May 22 , Georgia was mentioned almost 590 in 50 major Russian newspapers; England was mentioned 420 times and NATO 425 . The Kremlin’s aggressiveness toward the neighboring countries is a major source of friction between it and the West, which became apparent at the Bucharest meeting of NATO in April 2008.

Many experts in Russia and the West believe that the imperial ideology is deeply rooted in the Russian mind. Of course, the traditions of the country’s political culture, with its authoritarianism and xenophobia, are quite strong. However, the impact of the media on the Russians is much stronger. Khrushchev easily and almost instantly transformed public attitudes toward Tito’s Yugoslavia, a “fascist country,” from deep hostility to friendliness. President Reagan was vilified by the Soviet media in all possible ways from the moment of his inauguration in January 1981. However, when he came to Moscow as Gorbachev’s guest in May 1988 (I was there and watched it myself), he was greeted by ordinary people and intellectuals with great joy.

It would be easier for the Kremlin to redirect the media away from its hostility toward the Ukraine and Georgia than make the judicial system honest and independent. If president Medvedev decided to “reboot” the Russian political process, he would have to go on friendly visits to the capitals of all neighboring countries, starting with Kiev and Tbilisi. These visits would be as historically important as Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade in 1955. He also must remove (which would be even easier) the main hawks on TV, including Maxim Shevchenko and Mikhail Leontiev, who sow the hatred of the external world on an everyday basis by inventing the most absurd theories about the subversive activities of the United States and the Ukraine against Russia.

Whether and when Medvedev will choose this scenario is highly uncertain. Many subjective and objective factors are in the game. So far, all signals coming from Moscow indicate that Medvedev, as Putin promised, will stick to the imperial ideology. He had no objection against the military parade on the Red Square on May 9, which was clearly addressed not to foreign governments in order to scare them, but only to the domestic audience in order to fuel the imperial spirit in the country. In his speech at the parade, Medvedev talked about some enemies who present threats to the motherland. In his capacity as president, Medvedev deemed it necessary to visit the base of strategic missiles in order to “enjoy,” as reported by a Moscow newspapers, “the might of Russian weapons.”

The new president also hailed Russian TV, an open bulwark of the imperial ideology, and the antidemocratic policy as “one of the best in the world.” Instead of Tbilisi and Kiev, Medvedev chose as the place of his first visits Astana (the capital of Kazakhstan) and Beijing (the capital of China). Both visits, as Moscow newspapers wrote, demonstrated the continuity of Putin’s foreign policy. However, these first steps did not doom the idea of a future perestroika. Mikhail Gorbachev, in the first year of his tenure, verbally attacked imperialism and considered the improvement of the Soviet military forces as his main task.

However, it is almost certain that a return to democracy in Russia lies in the capitals of Ukraine and Georgia. Friendly relations with its neighboring countries are important to Russia because any hatred of them damages the Russian people. Whoever becomes the next American president, he or she should pay special attention to the relations between Russia and its neighbors. Without an improvement of these relationships, Russia will not be a stable partner in solving the world’s major problems.

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Stability

President Vladimir Putin and First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, March 7, 2006.
[image source]

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev, May 12, 2008.
[image source - some of the comments there are laugh-out-loud funny]

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День Победы...Путина?

Does the way this photo was shot remind you of anything? [image source]

An interesting thing about this era of "tandemocracy" that seems at least for the moment to be upon us - even more than usual, everything can be seen (at least) in two ways. Putin's policy-laden speech to the Duma could be (a) a way for him to show that, in contrast to Medvedev, whose inaugural speech seemed relatively empty (notwithstanding the banalities about human rights and freedoms and the law; mentioning these things is not necessarily indicative of a change or "thaw," after all the idea of "free people in a free society" was prominent in Putin's 2004 inaugural speech and "dictatorship of the law" was a theme dating back to early in Putin's first term), Putin will continue to be the policymaker-in-chief; or (b) a soon-to-be Prime Minister making a speech about domestic policy fully appropriate for someone in his position.

The proposal of an oil tax reduction could be (a) Putin's way of showing the oiligarchs that he is the one who can continue to provide them with goodies (and, again, a way of underscoring who calls the shots on the issues the elites are really concerned about - hint: those issues are not "freedom" and "law") or (b) a thoughtful way to help President Medvedev's first term get started off on a note of optimism. Putin's uncontrolled laughter at Zhirik's silliness in the Duma on May 8 (truly, the court jester amusing the sovereign(s)) could be either (a) the relieved laughter of a man who has had the weight of governing Russia lifted from his shoulders, or (b) the nefarious chortling of a man who finds himself amused by the high position occupied by such a clown within the system he has set up and intends to continue to control.

Allowing Zyuganov's critical speech to the Duma to appear on Channel 1 could be (a) a good way to demonstrate the existence of an opposition while not giving media time to anyone who could actually be a viable independent contender for the presidency in the future or (b) an actual indication of some sort of "thaw" with respect to criticism of the government appearing on the major TV channels. I could go on, but I've probably already lost even my 10 regular readers by this point.

Only time will tell if Medvedev turns out to be his own man as President or simply a "Prezik" to be used by Putin like a condom ("prezik" in Russian slang) to stay safely inside the Russian body politic and later disposed of. Please forgive the metaphor - I'm hardly the first to think of it, and doesn't it work, at least to a point?

[image source]

It's possible that May 8, 2008, will come to be seen as the day Putin began to fade from the scene; at the moment, though, it seems more likely that we'll look back on it as the day VVP changed chairs but kept pulling most of the same strings. The focus of the endless Kremlinoputinology will now turn to the relationship between Vova and Dima and will no doubt include much speculation about when VVP might start thinking about returning to the Kremlin.

One bit of speculation so far has been that the calendar of elections might be changed so that the parliamentary and presidential elections don't fall in the same year, which could entail a new presidential election in 2010, by which time the Constitution could already have been amended to allow for 7-year presidential terms. Putin could serve two of those and be ready for a hard-earned retirement. It's all idle speculation at this point, though.

In any event, from outside Russia, there seems to be hope for a change, hope that the dyarchy will eventually reveal rifts within the ruling elite and the result will be some sort of pluralism - or at least a lurch in the direction of a more cooperative posture towards the West, one that recognizes that interests can coincide and that "defending Russia's national interests" does not always have to mean playing the spoiler to America or resisting what Western countries want. From inside Russia, this prediction seems as good as any other I've seen:

In the circus they only keep the little bears until they're three years old, after that they mature and are unmanageable and extremely aggressive.

There's no doubt that "Operation Successor" has up to now been as successful as its authors could have hoped. If one takes the maximally cynical view of Putin, one must assume he'll be watching Dima like a hawk to make sure the latter doesn't "pull a Putin" and develop a mind of his own. If one believes that Putin is contemplating fading from the scene in a couple of years, well, his first appearance as PM doesn't really suggest a man who's thinking about hanging it up, but perhaps there will be a trend in that direction.

In any event, the country will have a chance to contemplate all of these things today while celebrating the victory over Germany 63 years ago. All seems set for Victory Day. By happy coincidence (actually, the date of Medvedev's inauguration is consistent with the past two inaugurations, so the timing wasn't specially arranged for this year), Putin's confirmation as PM came just in time for the country to celebrate with a long weekend.

It's a well-known fact that Moscow doesn't believe in tears. Apparently,
though, Moscow does believe in gigantic, man-made phallic symbols.
[image source]

So, after convincing the nation to "slit'sia v ekstaze" and vote overwhelmingly for Medvedev, Russians will have the chance to "spit'sia v ekstaze" while enjoying what will no doubt be wall-to-wall TV coverage of the military parade in Moscow. One has to ask whose victory is really being celebrated, especially given the somewhat controversial decision to return this year to the Soviet practice of displaying missiles and other hardware in the Victory Day parade.

Photo from Nashi's 2007 summer camp at Lake Seliger.
The banner says, "There will be sovereign democracy!"
[image source]

Adding to the impression that Putin & Co. are celebrating their victories in the 2007-08 elections is the fact that, just like after a military victory, various heroic veterans have recently been rewarded for their service to the fatherland (or, as Gazeta headlined its story on this, "For Servicing the Fatherland"):

KREMLIN AWARDS POLITICAL SUPPORTERS (RFE/RL, April 28, 2008)
President Putin has signed a decree awarding state orders to a number of Kremlin-friendly analysts, political commentators, and media figures, "Kommersant" reported on April 26. According to the decree, which was reportedly signed earlier this month, the order For Service to the Fatherland, first degree, was given to IMA public-relations group head Andrei Gnatyuk.

The same award, second degree, was given to All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion Director Valery Fyodorov, former Nashi leader and current State Youth Affairs Committee Chairman Vasily Yakemenko, and Effective Politics Foundation head Gleb Pavlovsky. The same decree bestows honorary certificates on Channel One head Konstantin Ernst, All-Russia State Television and Radio Company (VGTRK) head Oleg Dobrodeyev, NTV head Vladimir Kulistikov, Center for Political Forecasting Deputy Director Vitaly Ivanov, and a number of activists in the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi. According to "Kommersant," the awards are directly tied to the contributions the recipients made to the victory of Unified Russia in the December 2007 Duma elections and Medvedev's victory in the March presidential election. Gazeta.ru reported on April 25 that Gnatyuk's IMA group oversaw the implementation of both election campaigns.

This should reinforce the conventional wisdom that VTsIOM polls on Russian domestic politics should be taken with a grain of salt. With respect to the executives from state-run TV channels, it simply underscores the obvious: they are the President's colleagues, his valued partners in the important task of keeping the masses properly mis- and underinformed; and they have been given a little pat on the head for smoothly managing the media environment during the recently concluded electoral cycle. Never mind that what Putin likely perceives as the main "victory" - the avoidance of a "colored revolution" - was, given his government's substantial genuine popularity, probably such a remote possibility as to really only exist as "cockroaches in his head," to use the Russian expression about personal hang-ups.

Anyway, the Kommersant article cited by RFE/RL digs deeper and describes the Putin Administration's recent tradition of taking care of the friendly journalists at state-run TV channels by bestowing government awards upon them (my translation):

In November of 2006, for the first time in the history of television President Putin gave a large group of TV employees (more than 100 people) awards phrased "For making a large contribution to the development of Russian teleradiobroadcasting and for long-time fruitful work." The formal reason for the awards was the 75th anniversary of broadcasting in the country. Among those receiving awards were predominantly employees of the three federal TV channels - Channel One, Rossiia, and NTV.

"For Services to the Fatherland" orders of the fourth degree were awarded to six people, including Mr. Ernst and Mr. Dobrodeyev. Mr. Kulistikov also received an Order of Honor. Half a year later in June of 2007, almost as many employees of the federal TV channels, mostly from Rossiia, NTV and TV Center (TVTs) received orders and medals of various ranks with the same phrase as the one used the year before for their colleagues.

The tradition actually seems to go back at least three years now - back in March 2005, I posted about Sergei Ivanov giving awards to then-ORT reporter Margarita Simonyan and her colleague from RTR. Simonyan's real reward, of course, turned out to be her chance to head up the Russia Today project. After all, nothing says "thank you" - in any language! - like the chance to manage the cash flowing into a government project. Kommersant also notes that Yeltsin officially thanked several hundred people after the 1996 elections, including members of the media, but there was no "For Service to the Fatherland" award at that time (it was introduced in 1999).

Regrettably, I haven't had much time in recent weeks to browse around and see what the Russian blogosphere is saying about all of this. Ilya Barabanov had a simple "no comment" about the awards story.

My photo, taken in late Dec. 2005 in Moscow.
An explanation of the meaning for non-Russian-speakers is here.
The photo is part of a large set of my photos of Moscow stickers,
graffiti and other "street art" which can be viewed here.

Notwithstanding the criticism which must be present in the RuBlogosphere (though as I mentioned, I haven't had time to survey it recently as much as usual), I doubt too many Russians really feel as negatively about Putin's latest victory as the folks who made the sticker shown above; certainly opinion polls suggest the percentage of people who view the current state of affairs negatively is quite low indeed. For the time being, that's true even of polls conducted by pollsters who haven't received awards for services rendered to the fatherland.

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The Russophobia Scarecrow

My comments on a commentary piece from today's Moscow Times:

The Russophobia Card
by Andrei Tsygankov
Moscow Times, April 3, 2008

The U.S. presidential candidates are increasingly playing the Russophobia card in their campaigns. In addressing Russia, Senators John McCain and Hillary Clinton have resorted to insulting President Vladimir Putin as a KGB spy who has no soul.

The first mistake in the column is an understandable but important one - substituting Putin for Russia. As Anders Aslund has recently noted, taking a dim view of the former does not have to mean one has given up hope for the latter.

After all, the harsh criticism to which Tsygankov refers has been chiefly of Putin and his signature style - and is it really surprising that individuals who are vying for the votes of American citizens would criticize someone who has sought to score political points internationally and at home by employing anti-American rhetoric? Furthermore, while McCain's criticism of Russia has been something of a minor campaign theme, one can discount this at least a bit if one recalls that one of McCain's main goals at this stage is to differentiate his approach to the world from George Bush's in the eyes of the voters. As for the implication that Hillary has been "increasingly" talking about Russia in any way whatsoever, I believe that's simply not the case.

Ironically, Tsygankov actually seems to be accusing McCain and Clinton of filching a page from Putin's campaign playbook. In making the largely unsupportable statement that "[t]he U.S. presidential candidates are increasingly playing the Russophobia card in their campaigns," he seems to be suggesting an atmosphere which is the mirror image of the crescendo of anti-Americanism which accompanied Russia's recent Duma and Presidential elections.

Russophobia is truly back into fashion, as Senator Joseph Biden admitted last week in a comment published in The Wall Street Journal.

That is an interesting gloss on Biden's column, which actually observed that "[b]y suppressing dissent, fueling suspicion of the West, and bullying smaller neighbors, the Putin administration has managed to undermine Moscow's prestige and bring Russophobia back into fashion." Far from being the reluctant admission of Russophobia implied by Tsygankov, Biden's column was at least the second in the last month to appear in a major American newspaper with proposals on how to improve the bilateral relationship - and, more importantly, acknowledging that "[w]hatever the American strategy has been, it clearly isn't working." This suggests that – rather than the environment of rampant Russophobia implied by Tsygankov – the American establishment’s thinking on Russia can be characterized by a growing recognition that each side bears some of the blame for the dysfunctional relationship and that a search for new solutions is necessary, but that an optimistic approach to the future is still possible.

The attacks on Putin and President-elect Dmitry Medvedev are widely supported in mainstream U.S. media. This demagoguery also extends to scholarly publications, such as "The New Cold War" by Edward Lucas, who claims that "Russia's vengeful, xenophobic and ruthless rulers have turned the sick man of Europe into a menacing bully." Just published, the book is getting a lot of publicity and is treated as a serious treatise by influential organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations.

I think it's more accurate to say that Lucas's book is being received as what it is - long-form journalism with elements of contemporary history and analysis, an editorial slant that's easy to oversimplify, and footnotes. Here is what Lucas himself said about his book:

"I'm absolutely not saying that the old Cold War is coming back. That had three dimensions. You mentioned military, ideology -- and it was global confrontation -- this one isn't -- and the Soviet Union then was a closed society. Russia is now very well integrated inter -- both world diplomatic structures and of course the economy and constant human contact. I'm absolutely not making that argument nor am I saying that Putin is a new Stalin. That would be grotesquely exaggerated.

But what I am saying is that we have been much too complacent, for a start, about both where Russia is -- has already got to and what the trajectory is -- that it sort of creeps up on us and things that seemed unimaginable then became isolated exceptions, then become -- happening rather more often and then suddenly become part of everyday life in Putin's Russia, and this has really been extremely troubling and so one thing I want to do is just give a wakeup call."

To be fair, I have heard Lucas compare Putin's rule to that of Hitler. But consider that in the Anglo-American world it is people like Lucas who make such statements about Russia, whereas in the Russian-speaking world it is people like Putin and members of his administration who make similar statements about America (this is, of course, in addition to the gaggle of reflexively anti-American commentators who receive top billing in the Russian media). And in his column about the supposed rise of American Russophobia, Tsygankov neglects to mention the fact that Lucas, um, isn't American.

Despite the anti-Russia rhetoric, many U.S. politicians feel that Russia doesn't matter in the global arena. Instead, they are preoccupied with other international issues, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. But Russia should matter, particularly in a world of new security threats and growing energy competition. The attitude of ignorance and self-righteousness toward Russia tells us volumes about the U.S. unpreparedness for the central challenges of the 21st century.

Tsygankov criticizes American political and media elites for their ignorant and arrogant approach to Russia. I don’t disagree with his assertions in this regard, but I don’t understand how Americans applying an approach to Russia which is sadly typical of the American approach to all foreign lands adds up to "Russophobia." Unfortunately, it has often seemed that simple neglect and short-sightedness have been to blame for America’s policy missteps with regard to Russia, rather than the sort of anti-Russian conspiracy suggested by Tsygankov. And when Russia's head of state goes out of his way to be stridently anti-American in his public statements, is it any wonder that Americans who are not specialists in foreign relations – and even some who are – fail to see how the U.S.-Russian relationship could actually be a fruitful one for both sides?

Then Tsygankov ranges dangerously close to the realm of unhinged conspiracy theorists:

Russophobia's revival is indicative of the fear shared by some U.S. and European politicians that their grand plans to control the world's most precious resources and geostrategic sites may not succeed if Russia's economic and political recovery continues.

I never know how to respond to statements like this. It's like trying to convince a small child that there aren't any monsters under the bed. If someone really believes this sort of thing, they won't be convinced otherwise.

One Russophobic group, exemplified by McCain, includes military hawks or advocates of U.S. hegemony who fought the Cold War not to contain the Soviet enemy but to destroy it by all means available.

This comment at Russia Blog suggests that more sensible responses to McCain's Russia policy are possible than simply waving in the direction of his team's Cold War vintage.

The second group is made up of "liberal hawks" who have gotten comfortable with the weakened and submissive Russia of the 1990s. They have an agenda of promoting U.S.-style democracy and market economy. The fact that the Soviet threat no longer exists has only strengthened their sense of superiority.

To be honest, I don't relish the idea of the McCainiac approach to Russia becoming U.S. policy, and I have concerns about the potential for a "back to the future" scenario under Obama (advised on Russia by Michael McFaul, who can sort of be seen as an embodiment of America's 1990s approach to Russia) or Clinton (the name says it all). But does Tsygankov really think that Obama himself, for example, really noticed or "got[] comfortable with" a weak and submissive Russia in the 1990s, before he was even in the Senate?

Finally there are lobbyists representing East European nationalists who have worked in concert with ruling elites of East and Central European nations to oppose Russia's state consolidation of power as well as promote NATO expansion, deployment of elements of a U.S. missile-defense system in Poland and Czech Republic, and energy pipelines circumventing Russia. These groups have diverse but compatible objectives of isolating Russia from European and U.S. institutions. Because of a lack of commitment to a strong relationship with Russia in the White House, a largely uninformed public and the absence of a Russian lobby within the United States, the influence that these groups exert on policymaking has been notable.

All that's missing is a mention of the Captive Nations Committee, a favorite bugbear of those who believe Russia is forever being needlessly maligned by malevolent busybodies of East European ethnicity based in Washington. Actually, snarkiness aside, I tend to agree with Tsygankov that the relatively rapid NATO expansion of the 1990s and since represented a triumph of interest group politics over what should have been seen as one of the U.S.'s overriding national interests - a cordial relationship with Russia.

Interestingly, Tsygankov laments the lack of a Russia lobby in the U.S. but does not note the cause. In Alexei Pankin's words, "People inside the Russian president’s administration or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose professional duty makes them responsible for shaping Russia’s image" display "the distinctive characteristic of the current regime’s mentality, utterly suspicious of independent initiatives and those who are not asking for money but offering all kinds of opportunities. It freely allocates funds as a form of reward for some sort of service to the administration, but not a means to achieve a goal." The ineffectual attempts to create a Russia lobby showcase the downside of having the unbridled accumulation of personal wealth as a substitute for a national idea.

Russophobia is not in U.S. national interests and is not supported by the American public. Various polls demonstrate that Americans do not agree with the assessment that Russia is a threat to the United States' values and interests. A recent BBC World Service poll revealed, for example, that 45 percent of Americans have a mainly positive attitude regarding Russia's influence in the world, compared with 36 percent who have a mainly negative attitude.

I couldn't agree more. This suggests, though, that Tsygankov's concern may be misplaced and that Americans don't actually listen too closely to what our presidential candidates say about issues like Russia policy. And why should we? It's not as though most Americans decide who to vote for based on foreign policy issues, with the notable exception of Iraq.

Yet Russophobia-driven groups have generally succeeded in feeding the media an image of Russia as an increasingly dangerous regime.

I can imagine which groups Tsygankov has in mind; still, this sentence might have been more convincing if he had named some of them. More likely, he didn't name them because - in any context other than a column in a Moscow newspaper read by people whose interests center on Russia - suggesting that groups with worldwide activities like Freedom House, RFE/RL, Reporters Without Borders, CEIP, and Heritage, all of which are sometimes accused of fanning the flames of Russophobia, are motivated in large part by an irrational fear of Russia (which is, after all, what "Russophobia" means) would be ludicrous.

Thousands of reports in the mainstream U.S. media implicate the Kremlin and Putin personally in murdering opposition journalists and defected spies. Only a handful of reports in less prominent outlets question such interpretations.

"Thousands"? That is an assertion that cries out for substantiation. Reports offering a more positive take on the Putin years - or at least a sober explanation of his popularity - only appear in "less prominent outlets"? That must be news to the New York Times.

Although it matters greatly which candidate will enter the White House in November, the more important issue is whether there will be a fundamental psychological adjustment in Washington away from Russophobia.

To be sure, the healing of the U.S. Russophobic mindframe is going to require a lot of time. Winston Churchill once commented that U.S. politicians "always do the right thing in the end. They just like to exhaust all the alternatives first." If this indeed is the case, we will not see a framework for meaningful cooperation with Russia any time soon.

Here, our columnist quite simply has things backwards. No matter who is elected president, "Russophobia" will not be a major plank in their campaign platform, nor is it quite the major element of the DC zeitgeist that Tsygankov suggests. Even McCain could be expected, optimistically, to allow cooler heads to prevail and avoid sudden moves. Anti-Americanism in Russia, on the other hand, is a defining characteristic of the country's foreign policy and was a key element of Putin's campaign appearances on behalf of United Russia. So, assuming Tsygankov is talking about what matters for the U.S.-Russia relationship, healing would seem to be more urgently needed in Moscow than in Washington.

I found this column disturbing enough to be worthy of such a lengthy response because it appears in the Moscow Times at a moment when the bilateral relationship appears to be at a fork in the road, and some in Moscow may believe that Tsygankov's kaleidoscope - in which isolated critical comments about Putin by McCain and Clinton are multiplied by reflection into a full-blown campaign of "increasing" Russophobia - is a valid lens through which to view the American political and media scene, which could bolster the arguments of those in Russia who would prefer to prolong the nostalgia-inducing atmosphere of Cold-War-style posturing which has gone on for too long already.

As a linguistic aside, it is interesting to note the origin of the phrase chosen for the title of this column (whether by its author or by the MT opinion-page editor). According to Wikipedia, "In the first, and more common context," an accusation of "playing the race card" "alleges that someone has falsely accused another person of being a racist in order to gain some sort of advantage." Since accusations of Russophobia are often trotted out in an effort to deflect attention from legitimate criticism of Russian policies, the title seems unintentionally apt.

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More on the power of two

[image source]

The cover of the latest issue of the New Times calls the current (and perhaps future?) period "Междуцарствие" - which I might translate as something like "interkingdom" or "interregency," although that doesn't really capture it which means "interregnum" - and, rephrasing Snoop's classic query, has several articles on the general theme of the subhead on the cover: "Whose chair is tougher."

And in an intriguing development which suggests that finely honed Russia-watcher skills might soon become transferable to US politics, a recent article in e-magazine Slate discusses how Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama "could run together and take turns being president" for the next 16 years by "creatively using the constitutional rules created by" the little-known 25th Amendment to the US Constitution.

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Tandemocracy, DIMAcracy, and other neologisms for a new era

Note the presence of "Iron Felix" in the background.
[Image source]

Tandemocracy (which I first saw as the headline of this Kommersant-Vlast' cover story, "Тандемократия") - this is certainly a more warm-and-fuzzy term than the archaic-sounding двоевластие (usually translated into English as the even more archaic-sounding "dyarchy").

DIMAcracy (or ДИМАкратия, which I first saw mentioned on Veronica Khokhlova's blog as "DIMAkratiya") - this is a witty pun on the nickname of the new president, but we'll have to see if it remains popular - as of now, Yandex blog search provides a number of results for the term but nevertheless comments, "Typo? You may have meant 'democracy'."

Putvedev - this is a nice way to refer to Russia's two leaders with a single term. The term occurred to me - and no doubt to many others - in February, but I believe the first use of it in the English-language press was in a Guardian column on March 3rd (translated into Russian by InoSmi under the headline "All Power to Putvedev"), followed closely by Sean Guillory's Pajamas Media piece the next day; and Lenta.ru headlined its March 3 roundup of Western press coverage of the Russian elections "The New Russian Putvedev."

Since people have started referring to the dyarchs - sorry, the tandemocratic leaders; tandemocrats, if you will - collectively as Putvedev, there is at least some possibility that if the t